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Executive Summary 
This White Paper explores the legal dimensions of the European Union (EU)’s value-driven cybersecurity 
by investigating the notions of ‘value-driven’ and ‘cybersecurity’ from the perspective of EU law. It starts 
with a general overview of legal issues in current value-driven cybersecurity debates (Chapter 2), show-
ing how values embedded within the framework of EU governing treaties have evolved during the inte-
gration process, and the important role they play in the cybersecurity regulation at EU level.  
Chapter 3 of the White Paper is devoted to the main critical challenges in this area: 1) the varied and 
sometimes unclear uses of the term ‘cybersecurity’, 2) the roles of stakeholders and the cooperation 
between them, and the 3) securitization of EU values and interests through cybersecurity rules.  
Chapter 4 points out and describes specific controversies concerning cybersecurity regulation in the EU. 
Ten disputed issues are given particular attention: 1) the functioning of human rights as drivers for EU 
regulation, 2) the regulation of risks to society through individual risk identification and proactive action, 
3) the attribution of roles to different stakeholders, 4) how individuals are being awarded with more 
rights, 5) controllership of data, 6) copyright protection, 7) regulation of online content, 8) the use of 
encryption, 9) permissibility of massive and generalised surveillance of individuals and 10) counterter-
rorism measures. 
Chapter 5 summarises the main findings of the literature review. The White Paper recognises that leg-
islative and policy measures within the cybersecurity domain challenge EU fundamental rights and prin-
ciples, stemming from EU values. The White Paper concludes that with the constantly growing number 
of EU measures governing the cybersecurity domain, the embedment of EU values enshrined in the EU 
Charter within these measures take place both on an ex ante and an ex post basis.  
This White Paper is based on the input provided by CANVAS project partners that is included in Annexes 
as follows: 
- Annex I includes a review of EU soft-law measures addressing and surrounding cybersecurity 
issues. 
- Annex II lists EU legislative measures on cybersecurity issues. 
- Annex III discusses cybersecurity and criminal justice affairs. 
- Annex IV is devoted to the discussion of cybersecurity, privacy and data protection matters.  
- Annex V provides an overview of cybersecurity definitions developed in national cybersecurity 
strategies of 18 EU Member States.  
- Annex VI provides a brief description of EU values listed in the EU governing treaties.  
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CANVAS White Papers – Overview 
In order to summarize the existing literature on the topics and issues that are relevant for the CANVAS 
project, the CANVAS consortium has created four White Papers as follows: 
- White Paper 1 – Cybersecurity and Ethics: This White Paper outlines how the ethical discourse 
on cybersecurity has developed in the scientific literature, which ethical issues gained interest, 
which value conflicts are discussed, and where the “blind spots” in the current ethical discourse 
on cybersecurity are located. The White Paper is based on an extensive literature with a focus 
on three reference domains with unique types of value conflicts: health, business/finance and 
national security. For each domain, a systematic literature search has been performed and the 
identified papers have been analysed using qualitative and quantitative methods. An important 
observation is that the ethics of cybersecurity not an established subject. In all domains, cyber-
security is recognized as being an instrumental value, not an end in itself, which opens up the 
possibility of trade-offs with different values in different spheres. The most prominent common 
theme is the existence of trade-offs and even conflicts between reasonable goals, for example 
between usability and security, accessibility and security, privacy and convenience. Other prom-
inent common themes are the importance of cybersecurity to sustain trust (in institutions), and 
the harmful effect of any loss of control over data. 
- White Paper 2 – Cybersecurity and Law: This White Paper explores the legal dimensions of the 
European Union (EU)’s value-driven cybersecurity. It identifies main critical challenges in this 
area and discusses specific controversies concerning cybersecurity regulation. The White Paper 
recognises that legislative and policy measures within the cybersecurity domain challenge EU 
fundamental rights and principles, stemming from EU values. Annexes provide a review on EU 
soft-law measures, EU legislative measures, cybersecurity and criminal justice affairs, the rela-
tion of cybersecurity to privacy and data protection, cybersecurity definitions in national cyber-
security strategies, and brief descriptions of EU values. 
- White Paper 3 – Attitudes and Opinions regarding Cybersecurity: This White Paper summarises 
currently available empirical data about attitudes and opinions of citizens and state actors re-
garding cybersecurity. The data emerges from reports of EU projects, Eurobarometer surveys, 
policy documents of state actors and additional scientific papers. It describes what these stake-
holders generally think, what they feel, and what they do about cyber threats and security 
(counter)measures. For citizens’ perspectives, three social spheres of particular interest are ex-
amined: 1) health, 2) business, 3) police and national security.  
- White Paper 4 – Technological Challenges in Cybersecurity: This White Paper summarizes the 
current state of discussion regarding the main technological challenges in cybersecurity and 
impact of those, including ways and approaches to addressing them, on key fundamental val-
ues. It provides an overview on current cybersecurity threads and countermeasures and focuses 
on ethical dilemmas that emerge when counteracting those threads. It also points to the fact 
that the cybersecurity community relies much more on interpersonal relations when sharing 
intelligence and data than in explicit national or supranational regulations. Furthermore, the 
White Paper presents advanced cryptographic techniques and data anonymization techniques 
that may help to solve or minimize some of the ethical dilemmas. 
All White Papers and additional material are available at the Website of the CANVAS project: ww.can-
vas-project.eu 
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1. Introduction 
The aim this White Paper is to summarize the current state of discussions on value-driven cybersecurity 
and EU law, granting special attention to issues of criminal justice and the protection of individuals’ 
rights to privacy and personal data. It outlines main challenges, positions and identifies legal mecha-
nisms for incorporating EU fundamental rights into regulatory measures and policies.  
In preparation for the main part of the White Paper, which summarises findings of the literature re-
search, six annexes were developed. Annex I includes a review of EU soft-law measures addressing and 
surrounding cybersecurity issues. Annex II lists the existing EU legislative measures concerning cyberse-
curity. Annex III discusses cybersecurity and criminal justice affairs; and Annex IV is devoted to the dis-
cussion of cybersecurity, privacy and data protection matters. Annex V outlines cybersecurity definitions 
developed in national cybersecurity strategies of 18 EU Member States. Annex VI provides a brief de-
scription of EU values listed in the EU governing treaties.  
The White Paper at hand has been prepared in the context of Work Package 2 (WP2) of the CANVAS 
project. It aims at providing input for the CANVAS workshops, to be organised within the scope of Work 
Package 5 (WP5) and dissemination activities foreseen in Work Packages 6, 7 and 8 (WP6, WP7 and 
WP8). It will also be made publicly available and accessible for interested stakeholders on the CANVAS 
website. 
 
1.1 Methodology 
The literature research presented in the main part of White Paper as well as Annexes III and IV entailed 
analysis of key EU legal and policy documents, working papers, guidelines issued by relevant authorities, 
academic literature and jurisprudence in the specific area at stake.  
The White Paper also specifies ten common controversies in the domain of cybersecurity and law (see 
Chapter 4), with a specific focus on a) criminal justice and b) privacy and personal data protection – the 
two areas that stand out as a key challenge for EU value-driven cybersecurity. In order to identify the 
main controversies out of numerous controversies that emerged during the literature review, five semi-
structured interviews with representatives of different stakeholder groups were conducted during the 
period of June 7- 14 June, 2017. A list of questions on fairly specific topics was developed with an aim 
to complement literature research.1 The questions were formulated in such a way they could help an-
swering research questions (e.g., What controversies could be identified in the domain of cybersecu-
rity?). The list of questions served as an interview guide; questions  followed a reasonable order that 
allowed interviewers ‘to glean the ways in which research participants view their social world’, which in 
this particular case has been shaped by their expertise and experience in the domain of cybersecurity.2 
The selected form of interviews allowed for a flexible process during which the interviewer could pick 
up on things that were said by interviewees.3 This particular way of carrying out interviews allowed 
understanding interviewees in a better way as they would be given an opportunity not only to position 
themselves within the field of cybersecurity or a particular issue but also to explain rationale behind 
their positions.  
The selected interviewees can be considered to represent different groups of major stakeholders in the 
domain of cybersecurity in the EU, namely policy makers and regulators, technology developers, IT ex-
perts, academia, and business. Interviews with representatives of different stakeholder groups proved 
                                                          
1 Bryman, A., Social Research Methods, Oxford University Press, 2008, 438. 
2 Ibid., 442. 
3 Ibid., 442. 
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to be valuable as they facilitated the creation of a list that entails major controversies of cybersecurity 
laws in the EU. 
The White Paper starts with a general overview of legal issues in current value-driven cybersecurity dis-
cussions (Chapter 2). The following Chapter 3 of the paper is devoted to challenges related to regulation 
of cybersecurity. Particular attention is granted in this chapter to criminal justice and protection of pri-
vacy and personal data protection law. Then, Chapter 4 points out controversies concerning cybersecu-
rity regulation in the EU. While doing so, the fourth chapter outlines positions and arguments currently 
at stake, and identifies existing and up-coming legal mechanisms for incorporating EU fundamental 
rights into innovation and policies. 
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2. Delimiting Cybersecurity in the EU 
There have been numerous attempts to define cybersecurity from a scientific, technical, political or legal 
point of view.4 Many definitions focusing on different dimensions of cybersecurity (e.g., political, mili-
tary, economic, technical, legal and citizens’) have been proposed by different actors, yet there is no 
single definition which fully captures the complexity of the matter at stake. As explained by the Euro-
pean Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) in its 2015 report Definition of Cyber-
security: Gaps and overlaps in standardization, cybersecurity is a broad and evolving term and therefore, 
the use of ‘a contextual definition’ of its meaning should always be privileged.5 The ENISA report noted 
that while opting for a specific definition can allow maintaining clarity, stakeholders and policy makers 
should select definitions that fit their particular needs.6 In practice, this means that ENISA does not 
propose any definition of ‘cybersecurity’ that could be shared by various stakeholders and policy mak-
ers, including EU institutions. Rather, it recommends adopting interpretations developed by standardi-
sation organisations, such as the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) 
and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), or international organisations, such as the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU).  
According to ITU, cybersecurity means ‘the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safe-
guards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and tech-
nologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets’.7 Alt-
hough this definition may appear extremely broad, and despite the fact that definitions related to tech-
nical requirements may serve better during a negotiation phase, it is important to consider that defini-
tions developed by standardisation organisations target the micro-management level. Therefore, they 
may carry a risk of conceptualising ‘cybersecurity’ in an unduly limited way. For example, cybersecurity 
may be seen only as a concern of risk that may arise online, it may be understood as a protection of only 
virtual assets, or it may only target malicious activities. 
Definitions adopted by different organisations typically represent different points of view, and can po-
tentially be at odds with each other. For example, some frame cybersecurity as a mere technical issue, 
whereas Member States in their national security strategies may regard cybersecurity as an issue of 
national security.8 The latter view may hamper the development of regulatory measures governing this 
particular area by the EU. Pressed by this concern, the EU legislator favours understandings in line with 
its objectives and competences, as outlined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).9 
It has chosen to employ a definition according to which ‘[c]ybersecurity commonly refers to the safe-
guards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, 
                                                          
4 For example, EU Member States tend to adopt their own definitions of cybersecurity; an overview of these definitions is 
provided in Annex V;  an overview of technical definitions for the term ‘cybersecurity’ is provided in ENISA, Definition of Cy-
bersecurity: Gaps and overlaps in standardization, December 2015, see further: Craigen, D., Diakun-Thibault, N., Purse, R., 
‘Defining Cybersecurity’, Technology Innovation Management Review 2014, 4(10), 13-21; Adams, S., Brokx, M., Dalla Corte, 
L., Galic, M., Kala, K., Koops, B. J., Skorvánek, I. (2015). The governance of cybersecurity: A comparative quick scan of ap-
proaches in Canada, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Tilburg University. 
5 ENISA, Definition of Cybersecurity: Gaps and overlaps in standardization, December 2015, 7. 
6 Ibid., 28. 
7 ITU, Recommendation, ITU-T X.1205, p. 2, ENISA, Definition of Cybersecurity: Gaps and overlaps in standardization, December 
2015, 16-17.  
8 For example, according to Ireland’s National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 ‘The Government’s Cyber Security Strategy 
sets out how Ireland will protect and improve the cybersecurity of Critical National Infrastructure in the context of national 
emergency planning’. 
9 According to Article 4.2 of the TEU, the EU recognises that issues related to ‘national security remains the sole responsibility 
of each Member State’. 
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from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and infor-
mation infrastructure’.10 In this context, cybersecurity’s primary objective is described ‘to preserve the 
availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information 
contained therein’.11 In the following section the EU approach to cybersecurity regulation is presented 
in greater detail.  
 
2.1 The EU and Cybersecurity 
In 2013, the European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
rity Policy published a joint communication presenting a Cybersecurity Strategy for the EU (EU Cyberse-
curity Strategy or 2013 Strategy), aiming ‘to make the EU’s online environment the safest in the world’.12 
The 2013 Strategy identified five strategic priorities, namely:13  
 Achieving cyber resilience by establishing minimum requirements for the functioning, coopera-
tion and coordination of national competent authorities for network information systems. 
 Drastically reducing cybercrime by 1) ensuring swift transposition of the cybercrime related Di-
rectives, 2) encouraging ratification of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, and 3) devel-
oping funding programs for the deployment of operational tools. 
 Developing a cyberdefence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) by 1) assessing operation EU cyberdefence requirements, 2) developing the EU 
cyberdefence policy framework, 3) promoting dialogue and coordination between civilian and 
military actors in the EU, and 4) facilitating a dialogue with international partners. 
 Developing the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity by 1) establishing a pub-
lic-private platform on NIS (Network and Information Security) solutions, 2) providing technical 
guidelines and recommendations for the adoption of NIS standards and good practices, and 3) 
encouraging the development of security standards for technology ‘with stronger, embedded 
and user-friendly security features’.  
 Establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU and promoting core EU values 
by mainstreaming cyberspace issues into EU external relations and Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP), and by supporting capacity building on cybersecurity and resilient information 
infrastructures in third countries. More specifically, the EU should ensure that its consultations 
with international partners on cyber issues are designed to complement the existing bilateral 
dialogues between the Member States and third countries. These consultations shall be driven 
by the EU core values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the 
respect for fundamental rights. Following the objectives of this priority, the EU aims at attaining 
a high level of data protection, including protection of personal data transfers to third countries.  
The 2013 Strategy built on previous initiatives and sectorial frameworks, such as the legal frameworks 
for telecommunications, electronic commerce and electronic signatures, policy and regulatory 
measures, which have traditionally delineated the fragmented landscape of EU’s approach to cyberse-
curity. The section below provides an overview of major policy documents that allowed advancing dis-
cussions on cybersecurity in the EU. Major legislative measures are listed in Annex II of this document. 
In autumn 2017, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy published a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union titled ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’. 
                                                          
10 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2013), Joint Communication 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7.2.2013 JOIN(2013) 1 final, 3. 
11 Idem. 
12 Idem. 
13 Ibid., 4-16. 
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This Joint Communication reaffirms policy objectives set in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy and it puts 
forward a set of step-by-step actions and measures that would allow 1) building greater EU resilience 
to cyber-attacks, 2) facilitating detection of cyber-attacks, and 3) strengthening international coopera-
tion on cybersecurity. In particular, the Joint Communication ‘calls for more robust and effective struc-
tures to promote cybersecurity and to respond to cyber-attacks in the Member States but also in the 
EU’s own institutions, agencies and bodies. It also requires a more comprehensive, cross-policy approach 
to building cyber-resilience and strategic autonomy, with a strong Single Market, major advances in the 
EU's technological capability, and far greater numbers of skilled experts’. 14 
 
2.2 Soft-law Paved the Way for Hard-law Addressing Cybersecurity 
As noted by Van der Meulen et al. 2015, in the last two decades the EU has not only been asserting itself 
as a prominent security actor, but it has also produced a significant amount of new regulation, initiatives 
and sectorial frameworks tackling issues arising from active use of information systems and networks.15 
Studying legislative measures without taking into account the wider context in which they were devel-
oped provides little insight into the debates underpinning their adoption, and it is therefore useful to 
also analyse EU soft-law measures (e.g., communications and strategies) that addressed issues related 
to cybersecurity.16 Therefore, in order to better understand how the EU regulatory approach towards 
cybersecurity has evolved over the years, it is important to reflect on EU soft-law. 
The review of EU soft-law measures, in particular policy documents, related to information systems and 
networks security allows establishing six observations. The review is included in Annex I of this White 
Paper and it presents EU policy documents, such as communications, Council resolutions and imple-
mentation reports that address issues of information systems and networks security. The reviewed doc-
uments cover the period of 2000-2016. The selected documents are presented in chronological order 
as this particular structure of the review allows tracking down the development of EU cybersecurity 
policy, including the emergence of the term ‘cybersecurity’. In order to find the first documents ad-
dressing issues related to cybersecurity, the authors relied on references included in policy documents 
to earlier documents, which are followed up, related or addressed similar issues. All of the reviewed 
documents are available in EU bibliographical databases and can be accessed on the Internet.  
1. First, the EU has not yet developed a holistic approach of cybersecurity protection, despite early 
calls for a comprehensive action.17 Relevant policy documents as well as legislative measures are 
found within frameworks addressing 1) network and information security measures (targeting op-
erators of essential services, and providers of critical and digital infrastructures), 2) electronic 
communications (which includes privacy and data protection issues), and 3) cybercrime. The blur-
ring boundaries between the three policy areas are raising questions with regard to the EU ap-
proach to cybersecurity regulation. A hypothetical example of blurring boundaries could include 
a situation, where an abuse of network and information security measures on a critical infrastruc-
ture results in a cybercrime, which in turn triggers the involvement of law enforcement authori-
ties. Whilst consulting legislative acts in the three policy areas may be feasible, information shar-
ing of different authorities involved in this case may be a formidable task. Therefore, establishing 
clear rules for evidence collection and sharing among competent authorities as well as for law 
                                                          
14 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2013), Joint Communica-
tion to the European Parliament, the Council, ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’, 
JOIN(2017) 450 final, 2017, 3.  
15 Van der Meulen Nicole, Eun A. Jo and Stefan Soesanto (RAND Europe), Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: 
Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses (2015), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/docu-
ment.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2015)536470.  
16 The detailed analysis of these documents is included in Annex I. 
17 European Commission, Communication ‘Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of Information Infra-
structures and Combating Computer-related Crime’, COM(2000) 890. 
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enforcement cooperation with the private sector are crucial.18 Additionally, the development of 
‘best-practice systematic approaches to software and hardware design and development’ for all 
IT systems, as suggested by High Level Group of Scientific advisors, may help to overcome the 
fragmented regulatory approach.19  
2. Second, the area of cybersecurity emerged gradually as a result of the EU responsive regulation 
approach.20 Similarly to other policy areas subjected to the responsive regulation approach, EU 
policy documents on cybersecurity firstly identified undesirable situations (e.g., lack of infrastruc-
ture, digital skills or trust in online service providers). Then, in response to these undesirable sit-
uations or conditions various measures were proposed. Often these measures were framed as 
strategies (e.g., Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union or Digital Single Market Strategy) 
or agendas (e.g., The Digital Agenda for Europe) with priority lists and specific action plans; the 
implementation of these action plans is evaluated after a certain period of time. Then, if neces-
sary, the measures addressing the undesirable situations or conditions are revised and modified.  
3. Third, issues concerning cybersecurity, such as protection of information systems and energy sup-
ply, were first brought in by the EU Member States within the scope of debates on security at the 
Council of EU. Building on this observation, it can be suggested that cybersecurity regulation in 
the EU has advanced mainly due to the political pressure from Member States. Explicit references 
to ‘cybersecurity’ can be found only in EU soft-law documents. The Digital Agenda for Europe 
Scoreboard 2012 and the Special Eurobarometer study, ‘Cyber security’, were among the first 
documents that introduced the term ‘cybersecurity’ in order to address various issues related to 
the digital environment.21 The term ‘cybersecurity’ in its more comprehensive sense to the EU 
discussions (i.e., going beyond cybercrime) was brought in after the adoption of EU Cybersecurity 
Strategy in 2013. In measures that are directly addressed to the Member States, the EU is reluc-
tant to use this term, preferring the term ‘security of information systems and networks’. This 
careful choice of wording may suggest that there is a ‘competence problem’, which is pivotal to 
the relationship between the EU and its Member States.22 But it would be more accurate to sug-
gest that the EU competence in the field of cybersecurity is still taking shape. As per Craig, EU 
competence represents a synergetic interaction of: EU competence that has been conferred to it 
by the Member States; Member States and the European Parliament acceptance of legislation 
that has given substance to the Treaty articles; EU jurisprudence; and the interpretation of EU 
competence by the institutions.23  
4. Fourth, from the inception of debates about cybersecurity protection, the importance of incor-
porating fundamental rights of individuals in EU policy and regulatory measures has been empha-
sised. For example, the Stockholm Program, a follow up of the European Security Strategy devel-
oped in 2003, while claiming that ‘law enforcement measures and measures to safeguard individ-
ual rights, the rule of law, international protection rules [should] go hand in hand in the same 
direction’, emphasised that the EU carries a duty to ‘respond to the challenge posed by the in-
creasing exchange of personal data and the need to ensure the protection of privacy’. 24 This claim 
surfaces in several other policy documents, even it has received little attention in the literature. 
5. Fifth, the objectives of relevant EU policies have remained practically invariable for almost two 
                                                          
18 European Commission, Communication ‘The European Agenda on Security’, COM(2015) 185 final, 19-20. 
19 High Level Group of Scientific Advisors, Cybersecurity in the European Digital Single Market. SAM, Scientific Opinion No. 
2/2017 March 2017. 
20 For more about responsive regulation see: Baldwin R., Black J., ‘Really Responsive Regulation’, 2008, Modern Law Review 
71, 59-74. 
21 European Commission, Communication ‘The Digital Agenda for Europe - Driving European growth digitally’, COM(2012) 
784 final and Special Eurobarometer 390, Cyber security, Wave EB77.2 – TNS Opinion & Social, 2012.  
22 Craig, P., The Lisbon Treaty: law, politics, and Treaty reform, Oxford University Press, 2013, 156. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Council of the EU, The Stockholm Program: An open and secure Europe serving the citizen, 17024/09 (2009), 3. 
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decades. For example, the EC Communication ‘eEurope 2002: Impact and Priorities’, which was 
an integral part of the Lisbon Strategy, stressed the need to enhance user confidence in the field 
of electronic commerce by 1) providing support to industry-led security certifications through co-
ordination of efforts and mutual recognition; 2) promoting privacy-enhancing technologies, in-
cluding proper codes and the consolidation of practice; and 3) stimulate public/private coopera-
tion on dependability of information infrastructures. These themes are also addressed among the 
strategic priorities and actions of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy. They are also echoed in the 2016 
Communication ‘Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive 
and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry’. 
6. Lastly, there was also a shift in security thinking in relation to cybersecurity. In this sense, early 
documents concerning cybersecurity used a generic understanding of threats and encouraged 
their exploration and identification,25 whereas the current legal and policy documents tend to 
frame debates in terms of risks.26  
 
2.3 EU Values 
The political motivation for establishing the European Economic Community (now the EU) was driven by 
the need to ensure security (i.e., peace) of European nations after the Second World War. It was deemed 
that security could be achieved by creating an economic interdependency. In 1950 the Schuman decla-
ration laid down a proposal to establish an oversight mechanism for a Franco-German production of 
coal and steel, the main materials that were used in the military sector.27 The participation in this mech-
anism would be open to other countries. Following up on the objectives laid down in the Schuman dec-
laration, three treaties have been developed, namely: the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community; the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC); and the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Atomic Energy (Euratom). All of the initial treaties referred to economic objec-
tives, such as economic expansion, the development of employment and raising the standard of living 
instead of referring to particular values.28 It can be suggested that the notion of EU values has morphed 
out in the debates about EU objectives, which are listed in Article 3 of TEU, during the successive treaty 
revision processes.29 This list no longer focuses exclusively on economic objectives. According to the 
current governing treaties, the core EU objectives include the promotion of peace, EU values and the 
well-being of its people.30 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a detailed list of EU values can be found in Article 2 of 
the TEU. According to this article, ‘[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of per-
sons belonging to minorities’.31 The following sentence of same article, explains that ‘[t]hese values are 
common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’.32 In other words, this means that the EU values 
                                                          
25 For example, as a result of European Commission, Communication ‘eEurope Benchmarking Report - eEurope 2002’, 
COM/2002/0062 final, a cyber security task force was established. 
26 For example, the NIS Directive and the GDPR require to take into account risks associated with the processing of data when 
deciding upon appropriate technical and organization measures. 
27 The Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, available at: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-
day/schuman-declaration_en.  
28 Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, available at: http://www.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Treaty%20constituting%20the%20European%20Coal%20and%20Steel%20Community.pdf.  
29 Steiner, J., Woods, L. EU Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, 51. 
30 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2010/C 
83/01); The Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article 3 (1). 
31 Ibid., Article 2. 
32 Idem.  
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are determined by the principles of pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice and equal treat-
ment of men and women. 
The same message is echoed in the EU Charter, which as of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has 
become legally binding. The Preamble of EU Charter claims that the EU is founded on common and 
‘universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’. Furthermore, ‘[t]he Union contrib-
utes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity 
of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member 
States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels; it seeks to 
promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free movement of persons, services, goods 
and capital, and the freedom of establishment.’33 The EU Charter observes that in order to attain these 
objectives ‘it is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in 
society, social progress and scientific and technological developments by making those rights more visi-
ble in a Charter.’34 
 
Treaty of the EU, Article 2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU, Preamble 
EU values 
Human dignity 
Freedom 
Democracy 
Equality (including equality  
between women and men) 
Non-discrimination 
The rule of law 
Respect for human rights  
(including the rights of persons be-
longing to minorities) 
Pluralism 
Tolerance 
Justice 
Solidarity 
Human dignity 
Freedom 
Democracy 
Equality 
The rule of law 
Solidarity 
Protection of individuals by estab-
lishing the citizenship of the Union 
and by creating an area of free-
dom, security and justice 
 
Human dignity 
Freedom 
Democracy 
Equality 
Non-discrimination 
The rule of law 
Respect for human rights 
Pluralism 
Tolerance 
Justice 
Solidarity 
Protection of EU citizens 
Table 1: Overview of values that are emphasized in the EU context. A brief description of each notion is 
provided in Annex VI of this White Paper. 
 
2.4 EU Values in External Action 
For a better understanding of EU values as established by EU treaties, Article 2 of the TEU should be 
connected with the provisions governing the EU external relations, namely Article 3(5) and Article 21 of 
the TEU.  
According to Article 3(5) of the TEU, ‘[i]n its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and 
promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to 
peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, 
                                                          
33 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2010/C 
83/01); The EU Charter, Preamble, § 2 and 3. 
34 Ibid., § 4. 
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free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of 
the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ 35 
According to Article 21 of the TEU, ‘1. The Union’ s action on the international scene shall be guided by 
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and re-
spect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. […] 
2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of 
cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: 
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international 
law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with 
the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders […].’36 
 
2.5 EU Values in Cybersecurity  
According to the 2013 EU Cyber Security Strategy, ‘the same norms, principles and values that the EU 
upholds offline, should also apply online’.37 In other words, the protection of fundamental rights, democ-
racy and the rule of law are the key priorities in cyberspace, similarly to the offline world. When ad-
dressing the issues related to the protection of fundamental rights, the EU Cyber Security Strategy em-
phasizes that ‘cybersecurity can only be sound and effective if it is based on fundamental rights and 
freedoms as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and EU core val-
ues’.38 The EU Cyber Security Strategy notes that safe networks and information systems can contribute 
to the protection of individuals’ rights. In particular, information-processing operations for the purposes 
of cyber security should not undermine the rights to the freedom of expression, personal data and pri-
vacy. The Strategy recognizes that cybersecurity is a shared responsibility and therefore democratic and 
efficient multi-stakeholder governance, in which public and private parties are represented, should be 
ensured.  
EU values shall guide EU institutions and Member States when representing EU interests in the interna-
tional context, for example, at meetings with representatives of third countries or at international or-
ganisations, such as the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations (UN).39 Brazil, China, India, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and the United States are considered to be EU strategic partners for cooperation on cyber policy 
and security of information and communication technologies.40  
                                                          
35 TEU, Article 3(5). 
36 Ibid., Article 21. 
37 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2013), Joint Communication 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7.2.2013 JOIN(2013) 1 final, 1. 
38 Ibid., 4. 
39 European Commission, Commission Staff Working document ‘Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy accompa-
nying the document Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Ninth progress re-
port towards an effective and genuine Security Union’ (Part 1), Brussels, 26.7.2017 SWD(2017) 278 final, 78. 
40 Idem. 
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2.6 Why do Values Matter? 
Values and governing principles may motivate decisions at various levels, and decisions related to policy, 
and legislation are no exception. Indeed, decisions are not value neutral and exemplify value driven 
choices, the influence of which can be analysed. Legal values are notably expressed in fundamental rights 
and principles. These values shape the legislator and the judiciary’s functioning, and may also affect they 
way specific legal, societal and ethical issues are conceptualized and perceived. In the EU, these values, 
embodied by fundamental rights and principles, are found in the European Convention of Human Rights, 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the EU Treaties. 
The commitment to protect human rights is included in EU Treaties next to the objective to promote 
scientific and technological advance.41 This commitment was further strengthened by awarding the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights with a legally binding status in Article 6 (1) of the TEU. The third para-
graph of that article also recognizes ‘fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights [ECHR] and Fundamental Freedoms […] shall constitute general princi-
ples of the Union’ s law’ and foresees the accession to the ECHR in Article 6 (2) of the TEU. Consequently, 
the EU, in addition to a duty to give reasons for its legislative measures, as foreseen in Article 296 of the 
TFEU, is obliged to make sure that any legal act (e.g., regulations, directives, recommendations, deci-
sions or opinions) it develops is in compliance with the set of rights enshrined in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, taking also into account the ECHR and constitutional traditions of the Member 
States.  
Nevertheless, value-driven EU cybersecurity regulation is not always a reality. For example, Kuner points 
out that some principles embedded in the EU legislative acts pursuing its values, such as a system of 
representatives foreseen in Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) for data controllers estab-
lished outside the EU, have been not implemented in practice.42 Kuner also argues that while EU pro-
claims its values as ‘universal, global standards for the Internet’ without considering values of other coun-
tries or regions, only a large-scale empirical study could help to determine what EU values are actually 
reflected in practice.43 
  
                                                          
41 TEU, Article 3. 
42 Kuner, C., ‘The Internet and the Global Reach of EU Law’ (February 1, 2017). Forthcoming, Collected Courses of the Academy 
of European Law (Oxford University Press); LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 4/2017; University of Cambridge Faculty of 
Law Research Paper No. 24/2017. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2890930, 31. 
43 Ibid., 29-31. 
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3. Challenges of Cybersecurity Regulation  
Technology, including ICT, continuously evolves and so do the opportunities and challenges it creates. 
Much has been written about the opportunities that technologies create in terms of economic growth, 
employment and inclusiveness.44 This section outlines the three main challenges that cybersecurity reg-
ulation faces in the EU. With the revision of the first EU Cybersecurity Strategy scheduled for September 
201745 and ongoing discussions about the mandate of ENISA, 46 the future of cybersecurity regulations 
appears to be at a crossroad – perceived cyber threats may shape political choices and lead to deeper 
integration or the creation of a Security and Defence Union.47 
 
3.1 Ambiguous Use of the ‘Cybersecurity’ Concept 
As described earlier, although numerous policies and regulatory measures have been adopted in order 
to advance the security of citizens, businesses and public administrations in the digital environment, 
there is no single definition of the term ‘cybersecurity’ at EU level. In fact, the EU has only recently started 
using the term ‘cybersecurity’ in its policy documents (e.g., communications, reflection papers). The 
adoption of a comprehensive EU Cybersecurity Strategy in 201348 can be considered to be the tipping 
point, triggering the increased use of the term in EU policy documents (e.g., in 2016 Communication 
‘Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and Innovative Cyberse-
curity Industry’). 
Nevertheless, in measures addressed to the Member States, EU institutions appear to be reluctant to 
use this term. That is the case, for example, of the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security 
of network and information systems across the Union (NIS Directive).49 The NIS Directive lays down ob-
ligations for all Member States to adopt certain measures (e.g., national strategies on the security of 
network and information systems) that would allow developing a culture of security across industries 
and sectors which rely on the use of information communication technologies. Within the context of 
this Directive, ‘security of network and information systems’ is regarded as ‘the ability of network and 
information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability, 
authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related services 
offered by, or accessible via, those network and information systems’.50 This definition seems to align 
the conception reflected in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy, where the underlying objective of cyberse-
                                                          
44 For example, European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication Networks, Content and Technology, A concept 
paper on digitisation, employability and inclusiveness: the role of Europe, May 2017. 
45 European Communication, Communication on the Mid-Term Review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market 
Strategy: A Connected Digital Single Market for All, Brussels, 10.5.2017, COM(2017) 228 final, 13. 
46 According to Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 concerning the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004, the assessment of ENISA mandate is carried out every 5 years (Article 
24.3). In preparation for the next revision scheduled for June 2018, the European Commission has launched a public consulta-
tion in January 2017.  
47 European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, June 2017. 
48 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2013), Joint Communication 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7.2.2013 JOIN(2013) 1 final. 
49 Emphasis added by the authors. 
50 NIS Directive, Article 4(2). 
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curity is considered to be the preservation of ‘the availability and integrity of the networks and infra-
structure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein’.51 Nonetheless, the NIS Directive 
formally addresses ‘security of information systems and networks’, and not cybersecurity.  
The ambiguity embedded in the term ‘cybersecurity’ allows for the term to be invoked across different 
policy areas described in sections 2.1 and 2.2. While this is not problematic in itself, the fragmented 
approach may not be cost-efficient.52 
 
3.2 Cooperation of Stakeholders 
Combating cybersecurity threats and risks is a multi-disciplinary matter that requires expertise and co-
operation of stakeholders within different domains, such as IT, psychology, law, education, and policy 
fields. Cooperation challenges may thus emerge at different levels. A good understanding of the roles of 
different actors and institutions assigned by law as well as those embedded in the EU governance struc-
ture can explain why tensions arise between them during the policy creation process. This in turn, can 
provide insights about how to facilitate and strengthen cooperation between different stakeholders. 
3.2.1 Cooperation of EU Institutions and Agencies Involved in Cybersecurity Protection 
Cybersecurity is a complex issue and several EU institutions, agencies and services share responsibility 
over this area. The European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for Communications Networks, 
Content & Technology (DG CONNECT) carries the main responsibility for implementing the policies that 
facilitate the creation of a Digital Single Market, thus encompassing cybersecurity. However, other Di-
rectorate Generals, such as DG Joint Research Centre, DG for Communications Networks, Content and 
Technology and DG for Mobility and Transport, also develop policies that directly or indirectly contribute 
to cybersecurity regulation. With more policy areas increasingly relying on ICT, the number of DGs that 
address issues related to cybersecurity has been growing. To date the cooperation between the DGs on 
cybersecurity affairs is often based on rigid internal communication rules rather than informal practices. 
Regulatory measures, such as EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity, proposed by the European Commis-
sion, are negotiated between the European Parliament and the Council. Table 2 lists EU agencies and 
bodies involved in the development and implementation of cybersecurity policies, at least with a con-
sultative role.53 Consult Annex III for additional information.  
While all these actors contribute to the overall goal of ensuring a high level of network and information 
security within the EU by addressing cybersecurity issues in different policy areas, their roles and re-
sponsibilities are not set in a clear governance structure. In order to address this challenge, ENISA, in its 
policy paper outlining the vision of the revised EU cybersecurity strategy, proposes a governance model 
that could potentially facilitate the cooperation and coordination of stakeholders’ effort.54 
 
 
                                                          
51 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2013), Joint Communication 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7.2.2013 JOIN(2013) 1 final, 3. 
52 ENISA, Principles and opportunities for a renewed EU cyber security strategy, ENISA contribution to the Strategy review, 
May 2017, 14. 
53 This figure is adapted from European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(2013), Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 
7.2.2013 JOIN(2013) 1 final, 57. 
54 ENISA, Principles and opportunities for a renewed EU cyber security strategy, ENISA contribution to the Strategy review, 
May 2017, 13-14. 
White Paper 2 – Cybersecurity and Law 
Horizon 2020 Grant Agreement No 700540  18 
In NIS In law enforcement55 In defence 
EDPS (European Data Protection Supervisor) 
 ENISA (EU Agency for Network 
and Information Security) 
 CERT-EU (a permanent Computer 
Emergency Response Team for 
the EU institutions, agencies and 
bodies) 
 EP3R (European Public-Private 
Partnership for Resilience) 
 EC3 (the European Cyber-
crime Centre at Europol) 
 CEPOL (the EU Agency for 
Law Enforcement Training) 
 Eurojust (EU's Judicial Coop-
eration Unit) 
 EEAS (European External Ac-
tion Service) 
 EDA (European Defence 
Agency) 
Table 2: Actors involved in cybersecurity protection in the EU. NIS: Network and Information Security. 
Furthermore, sometimes cooperation is hindered by colliding positions on principled issues that stake-
holders may take. For example, the Council of the EU, representing the Member States, and ENISA, an 
EU agency raising awareness about network and information security in society issues for citizens, con-
sumers, enterprises and public-sector organisations in the Union, do not share a similar opinion about 
the use of encryption. In November 2016, the Council of the EU proposed the launch of a reflection 
process on the use of encryption in the criminal justice sector, led by the European Commission.56 Issues 
related to the use of encryption as well as its possible regulation were then further addressed in a Coun-
cil meeting in November 2016. The preparatory note for the meeting underscored that ‘the use of en-
cryption deprives law enforcement of crucial evidential opportunities, especially given the fact that it is 
no longer restricted to desktop computers but increasingly available on mobile devices and many com-
mercially available communication platforms have now encryption by-default (increasingly by way of 
end-to-end encryption leading to situations where services are not interceptable).’57 While recognising 
‘the need to address both the technical and legal (criminal justice) aspects of the issue [of encryption] 
and to focus future work on practical solutions that would facilitate law enforcement work without un-
dermining encryption as such and the protection of citizens’ privacy’, the Council of the EU reiterated 
that a careful balance should be struck between the needs of law enforcement and citizens’ rights.58  
ENISA seems to hold a different opinion on the regulation of encryption. In its opinion paper on the 
subject, ENISA concluded that weakening encryption to enable lawful interception is not an optimal ap-
proach. ENISA noted that as a result of weakening encryption, security of digital signatures and many 
other applications would be undermined. ENISA invited to carry out further benefits and risks analysis, 
as well as a more in-depth exploration of alternatives before taking any legislative actions.59 Similarly, 
the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), an independent data protection authority monitoring 
the processing of personal data by EU institutions and bodies, has on several occasions reiterated that 
                                                          
55 Here, ‘law enforcement’ is to be understood in a broad meaning that includes any entity that contributes to law enforcement. 
56 Cf. Note 14711/16 from the Council of the European Union Presidency to the Permanent Representatives Committee/Coun-
cil on the subject title ‘Encryption: Challenges for criminal justice in relation to the use of encryption - future steps - progress 
report’, Brussels November 23rd 2016, 7. 
57 Council of the EU, Presidency Progress report: Encryption: Challenges for criminal justice in relation to the use of encryp-
tion - future steps, LIMITE CYBER 137, JAI 976, 14711/16, Brussels, 23 November 2016.  
58 Outcome of the 3508th Council meeting, document 15391/16 and press release 67 by the Justice and Home Affairs depart-
ment, section ‘Criminal justice in Cyberspace’, Brussels, 8th and 9th December 2016, 7. 
59 European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, ‘ENISA’s Opinion Paper on Encryption - Strong Encryption 
Safeguards our Digital Identity’, December 2016, 5. 
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installing backdoors to devices or encryption schemas in order to identify criminals and terrorists would 
impinge on security of all devices and applications that include encryption.60 
In any case, EU institutions and bodies working on different aspects of cybersecurity policy aim at culti-
vating their cooperation through both formal and informal ways, such as networks of specialised ex-
perts, conferences and multi-stakeholder gatherings.61 
3.2.2 Cooperation between National Authorities within the individual Member States, as 
 well as within the EU 
While the EU Cybersecurity Strategy calls for a comprehensive approach towards cybersecurity protec-
tion, three pillars constitute different legal frameworks tackling cybersecurity capability. These include 
the network and information systems, law enforcement, and defence.62 This approach has developed 
as a result of previous policy documents which recognised that ‘effective policy making needs a clear 
understanding of the nature and extent of the challenges’ brought by technologies and which to this end 
suggested ‘a three-pronged’ approach that would include 1) specific network and information security 
measures, 2) the regulatory framework for electronic communications (which includes privacy and data 
protection issues), and 3) the regulatory framework for the fight against cybercrime.63 
Consequently, there are numerous entities that are responsible for enforcing or monitoring compliance 
with different frameworks at national level. The EU encourages cooperation between these entities re-
sponsible for various dimensions of cybersecurity. However, in practice cooperation extends to their 
counterparts in other countries through various cooperation groups (e.g., Article 29 Working Party, the 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC)). In some cases, entities and reg-
ulators having responsibilities over different areas of cybersecurity within a country do not have effective 
communication practices and legislative bases governing their information exchange put in place (e.g., 
between CERTs and law enforcement authorities). In this regard, the mandatory requirement to adopt 
national strategies on the security of network and information systems, introduced by the NIS Directive, 
is very timely.64 It aims at ensuring that Member States clarify their cybersecurity governance framework 
and define roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the public and private sectors. The attribution of 
clear responsibilities and roles to each entity is considered to facilitate cooperation.  
The European Criminal Policy Initiative, led by a group of criminal law scholars, is an example of bottom-
up development, which seeks to clarify roles of law enforcement authorities. In 2013, it published a 
manifesto concerning ‘the laws of criminal procedure and mutual legal assistance, which recently have 
increasingly been shaped by Union legislation’. 65 The manifesto insisted on adhering to the highest 
standards of the rule of law and protection of fundamental rights within the scope of laws governing 
                                                          
60 See, EDPS, Guidance on Security Measures for Personal Data Processing Article 22 of Regulation 45/2001, and EDPS, Opinion 
8/2015 Dissemination and use of intrusive surveillance technologies. 
61 For example, Europol organized a conference on privacy in the digital age of encryption and anonymity online in 2016. This 
conference brought together stakeholders from various backgrounds, including law enforcement agencies, as well as repre-
sentatives of the legislator, justice, private parties, academia, NGOs and any other experts willing to share their perspective 
in order to contribute to effectively striking the right balance between freedom and security. ENISA organizes the Annual 
Privacy Forum, which provides a platform for exchange of ideas ranging from policy priorities to scientific developments, also 
see: European Commission, Commission Staff Working document ‘Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy accom-
panying the document Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Ninth progress 
report towards an effective and genuine Security Union’ (Part 1), Brussels, 26.7.2017 SWD(2017) 278 final, 70. 
62 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2013), Joint Communication 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7.2.2013 JOIN(2013) 1 final, 4. 
63 European Commission, Communication - A strategy for a Secure Information Society - ‘Dialogue, partnership and empower-
ment’ {SEC(2006) 656} /* COM/2006/0251 final, 8. 
64 NIS Directive, Article 7. 
65 European Criminal Policy Initiative, ‘Manifesto II’. 
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criminal procedure, even though in this area of law legislature seeks to balance interests of states, soci-
eties and individuals.66 It put forward six demands for the EU legislator: 1) limitation of mutual recogni-
tion67, 2) balance of the European criminal proceeding68; 3) respect for the principle of legality and ju-
dicial principles in European criminal proceedings69; 4) preservation of coherence; 5) observance of the 
principle of subsidiarity70; 6) compensation of deficits in the European criminal proceedings.71 While 
little action has been taken in response to these demands, discussion on the EU role within the area of 
freedom, security and justice is still ongoing.72 
 
3.3 Securitization of EU Values and Interests 
The observation that ‘information revolution makes security and increasingly important concern in all 
sectors of society’73 withstands the test of time and accurately reflects the current debates within the 
EU.74 In the reflection paper on the future of cybersecurity regulation, the EC emphasises the need to 
protect European values and interests against new types of threats.75 In order to improve the competi-
tiveness and security of the EU, the reflection paper considers three scenarios (i.e., Security and Defence 
Cooperation, Shared Security and Defence, Common Defence and Security) which would allow pooling 
Member States’ industrial and technical resources. Within the scope of this document, the EC questions 
EU competencies in the field of cybersecurity and considers ways to extend them beyond the limits of 
Digital Single Market. Cybersecurity becomes intertwined with objectives of a Security and Defence Un-
ion and it is suggested that deeper integration, in particular the creation of a Common Defence Security, 
would improve cybersecurity resilience both at national and EU levels. It is also argued that deeper inte-
gration scenario would allow for ‘Europe […] to deploy detection and offensive cyber-capabilities’, which 
could be used in case of ‘cyber-attacks or external interference in Member States’ democratic pro-
cesses’.76  
The European Commission’s rhetoric in the recent policy documents is somewhat biased as it insists on 
the need for more cooperation and coordination of programmes concerning the interoperability of in-
formation systems for security, border and migration management.77 For example, the European Com-
mission in one of its recent documents refers to ‘the global cyberattack using ransomware’ (known as 
WannaCry) as a case demonstrating the need for expansion of EU actions, and thus competences, within 
the cybersecurity domain.78 In the other policy document, the European Commission relies on statistics 
about ransomware from the United States in order to strengthen its claim about the potential risks of 
cyberattacks for business, economy and democracy in the EU; ‘wider instruments for European solidarity 
                                                          
66 Ibid., 430. 
67 Through the rights of the individual (suspect, victim or third person), through the national identity and ordre public (public 
policy) of the Member States, and through the principle of proportionality. 
68 Warning against a possible shift in power solely in favour of the prosecution, they suggest creating supranational institu-
tions that strengthen the position of the affected individuals. 
69 There is a need for a clear set of rules governing which Member States may exercise criminal jurisdiction. 
70 EU action may only be taken on the condition that the goal pursued a) cannot be reached as effectively by measures taken 
at the national level, and b) due to its nature or scope can be better achieved at Union level. 
71 Safety mechanisms should include compensation measures to ensure that the first five demands are met. 
72 European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, June 2017. 
73 Eriksson, J., Giacomello, G., ‘The information Revolution, Security and international Relations; (IR)relevant theory?’ Interna-
tional Political Science Review Vol. 27, No. 3, 2006, 221-244.  
74 European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, June 2017, 6. 
75 Ibid., 6. 
76 Ibid., 14-15. 
77 Idem. 
78 European Commission, Communication on Seventh progress report towards an effective and genuine Security Union, 
16.5.2017 COM(2017) 261 final, 2. 
White Paper 2 – Cybersecurity and Law 
Horizon 2020 Grant Agreement No 700540  21 
and mutual assistance’ in the field of cybersecurity could address these risks.79 This far stretched rhet-
oric contradicts the rationale of EU better regulation policy which should be driven by the ‘best available 
evidence’ and the involvement of stakeholders.80 Public statements made by some EU officials hint that 
the European Commission could have taken a different approach in response to the increasing number 
of cyberattacks and cyberthreats. For example, the Assistant EDPS suggested that if appropriate security 
measures, required under data protection law, had been implemented, the recent attacks could have 
been prevented.81 This observation suggests that in response to cyberthreats, the European Commis-
sion could have emphasised the need for better implementation of requirements stemming from EU 
data protection framework rather than on the need for stronger cooperation mechanisms. 
Finally, the fight against cybercrime constitutes an essential part of cybersecurity, although it addresses 
a limited subset of threats. As cybercrime is endangering our societies from the online world, criminal 
justice contributes to the protection of our assets and uphold our values in the cyberspace. Cybercrime 
is inseparable from criminal law since the latter defines it. However, the fight against cybercrime is not 
merely a legal issue. The THOR concept presents four dimensions of the problem: (T)echnical, (H)uman, 
(O)rganisational, and (R)egulatory, the regulatory dimension being ‘related to law provisioning, stand-
ardisation and forensics’.82 For more information on issues concerning the area of freedom, security 
and justice, consult Annex III of this White Paper. 
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4. Controversies over Cybersecurity  
 Regulation 
4.1 Defining Controversies 
Debates on the regulation of cybersecurity in the EU are marked by a series of crucial controversies, the 
number of which is steadily increasing, as cybersecurity impacts a wider range of policy domains. Simi-
larly to controversies in other fields, those in this area imply that there is ‘a lot of disagreement or ar-
gument about something, usually because [the issue at stake] affects or is important to many people’.83 
Indeed, cybersecurity is of great importance for stakeholders representing multiple viewpoints, as well 
as industries that hold particular perspectives and interests. Currently, ten controversies stand out for 
their role in shaping debates over cybersecurity regulation in the EU. For more controversies concerning 
EU cybersecurity law and specific literature references, consult Annex III on criminal justice and Annex 
IV on privacy and personal data protection law. 
4.1.1 Fundamental Rights as Drivers for EU Regulation? 
Many EU policy documents in the cybersecurity domain recognise that any measures taken with respect 
to the protection of EU citizens, society as well as information systems and infrastructure have to be 
developed ‘in accordance with the commitment of the European Union to respect fundamental human 
rights’.84 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, there has been an ever greater emphasis on 
such imperative of adhering to fundamental rights, in the EU policy documents, legislation and bilateral 
agreements that facilitate cooperation in the law enforcement area.  
For example, the NIS Directive in its Recital 75 notes that the ‘Directive respects the fundamental rights, 
and observes the principles, recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU 
Charter), in particular the right to respect for private life and communications, the protection of personal 
data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to an effective remedy before a 
court and the right to be heard’,85 before emphasising that obligations imposed by the Directive should 
be implemented in accordance with the aforementioned rights and principles. Then, the European Com-
mission in its proposal for the ePrivacy Regulation, updating the rules governing the processing of data 
through electronic communication networks, proposed extending the scope of confidentiality obliga-
tions, which are at the core of the EU fundamental right to privacy. In particular, the European Commis-
sion proposed that the ePrivacy Regulation applies to the so-called ‘over the top’ services (OTTs), such 
as Voice over IP, and communications services that are ancillary to another service, such as a chat on a 
gaming platform.86  
Fundamental rights and principles enshrined in the EU Charter, however, must be considered only to 
the extent where the EU law is applicable. Article 51(1) of the EU Charter specifies that its provisions 
are addressed to EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and to the Member States only when they 
                                                          
83 Cambridge Dictionary, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/controversy.  
84 European Commission, Communication, ‘Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of Information In-
frastructures and Combating Computer-related Crime’, COM(2000) 890, 2; see also: European Commission, Communication, 
The Digital Agenda for Europe - Driving European growth digitally, COM(2012) 784 final, 12; Council of the EU, The Stockholm 
Program: An open and secure Europe serving the citizen, 17024/09, 4. 
85 Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures for a high common level of security 
of network and information systems across the Union. 
86 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for 
private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation 
on Privacy and Electronic Communications), Recital 11.  
White Paper 2 – Cybersecurity and Law 
Horizon 2020 Grant Agreement No 700540  23 
are implementing Union law.87 The latter is broadly interpreted by the CJEU. In Aklagaren v Hans Aker-
berg Fransson, the CJEU inferred that provisions of the EU Charter apply in view of Treaty obligations 
and no particular EU measure needs to be implemented.88 The CJEU emphasised that ‘[t]he applicability 
of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter’. 89 Nev-
ertheless, in a number of instances compliance with fundamental rights requirements by the EU legis-
lator has been not only questioned, by actually refuted by the judiciary. 
For example, the current legal set up allowed to successfully challenge on fundamental rights grounds 
Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision 
of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks (the 
Data Retention Directive) at the Court of Justice of the EU. The Data Retention Directive was annulled 
by the Grand Chamber of the Court on the grounds that the blanket collection of communication data, 
in particular traffic and location, by providers of communication providers was not proportionate (i.e., 
excessive), and therefore constituted an infringement of the rights privacy and protection of personal 
data of individuals that are enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU.90 This decision did however not automatically annul Member States’ laws implementing the Data 
Retention Directive.  
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) Opinion 1/15 concerning the draft agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and Canada on the transfer of Passenger Name Record is also an illustrative example high-
lighting the importance of adherence to the fundamental rights recognised by the EU.91 In the Opinion 
the CJEU concluded that the envisaged agreement might not be concluded in its current form because 
rules governing the transfer of PNR data from the EU to Canada entail an interference with the funda-
mental rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data. 
These examples demonstrate that values stemming from the EU Charter play an important role in the EU 
regulatory approach in the cybersecurity domain, even though they are contested by the EU institutions. 
It is suggested that a strong emphasis put on the protection and promotion of fundamental rights form 
a unique and distinctive EU approach to cybersecurity.92 This approach is often challenged during mul-
tilateral and bilateral negotiations with international organisations and EU strategic partners for coop-
eration on cyber policy.93 For protection of fundamental rights to become an established principle in 
the cybersecurity domain, the EU has to consistently advocate for it in its internal and external 
measures. 
4.1.2 Regulation through Individual Risk Identification and Proactive Action 
Recent regulatory measures, such as the GDPR and NIS Directive, impose requirements aiming at im-
proving cybersecurity. The basic principle here is that the ones responsible for the operations must take 
appropriate security measures. For example, the NIS Directive stipulates that operators of essential ser-
vices must ‘take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage the 
risks posed to the security of network and information systems which they use in their operations’.94 In 
particular, the operators of essential services should also ‘take appropriate measures to prevent and 
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minimise the impact of incidents affecting the security of the network and information systems used for 
the provision of such essential services, with a view to ensuring the continuity of those services’. 95 In a 
similar vein, the GDPR requires data controllers and processors to ‘implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk’.96  
This approach is controversial because it relies on responsible parties identifying the risk and acting upon 
it independently, with no interference of regulators. However, measuring risk is contextual and is con-
sidered to be a knowledge intensive process.97 Hildebrandt and Tielemans suggest that the use of the 
word ‘appropriate’ relates to the contextual and dynamic nature of such measures.98 In practice, this 
means that what is appropriate changes and depends on the identified risk. Depending on the applicable 
framework, a party responsible for implementing appropriate measures, (e.g., controllers, processors or 
providers of essential services) carries a duty to identify risks associated with their activities or business, 
such as the provision of services. But how accurate are these entities in their risk identification pro-
cesses? These entities are also awarded a wide discretion to determine appropriate technical and or-
ganisational measures that are most appropriate in response to these risks. It should be noted that 
appropriate measures include not only technical solutions but also organizational practices and policies. 
Additionally, both the GDPR and NIS Directive require a party responsible for the implementing appro-
priate measures to consider ‘the state of the art’. ‘The state of the art’ is as such a dynamic concept and 
requires the responsible entities or the ones designing services for them to consider the most recent 
developments and knowledge associated with technologies that are used. Gathering knowledge and 
information about the ‘state of the art’ requires controllers to keep up to speed with various develop-
ments in fields concerning standardisation (e.g., regional or international standards), technology (e.g., 
software and hardware solutions), cyber threats, and research. Invoking the concept of ‘the state of the 
art’ may be indicative of the rapidly changing security landscape. However, while this obliges responsi-
ble parties (mostly IT industry actors) to continuously learn about the recent trends and best practices 
concerning security measures that are available in the market, it neither mandates the use of any spe-
cific technologies, nor it requires to spend a certain percentage of the investment on ‘appropriate’ or-
ganisational and technical measures. Some suggest that this amount should reach about 37 % of the 
expected loss that could result from a cybersecurity breach, but in practice, the exact amount that is 
invested in security measures depends on the nature, scale, context of the processing as well as on 
information sets that are going to be processed.99  
4.1.3 Attribution of Roles to Different Stakeholders 
One of the key challenges of cybersecurity regulation is to impose the right obligations on the right ac-
tors. Current regulation of data protection by design focuses exclusively on data controllers (i.e., entities 
defining the means of the processing of personal data), which may address only part of the problems in 
the area, as this obligation to implement data protection by design does not extend to the actual devel-
opers of technology or service providers. Recital 78 reveals some of the hesitations of the legislator, 
mentioning not only controllers and processors but also the producers of the products, services and 
applications. In particular, the Recital encourages the latter ‘to take into account the right to data pro-
tection when developing and designing such products, services and applications and, with due regard to 
the state of the art, to make sure that controllers and processors are able to fulfil their data protection 
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obligations’.100 While recognizing value of this Recital, it should be noted that the actual software de-
velopers or producers of hardware, unless they are data controllers or processors, are not subjected to 
legal obligations foreseen in the EU data protection framework. The debate within the field of data 
protection over who should be responsible for ensuring rights of individuals in the online environment 
is still ongoing in the EU. Discussions concerning the proposed ePrivacy Regulation also confirm that this 
is an unresolved issue.101 
Likewise, the EU liability framework in many cases may favour software developers. While software is not 
explicitly included in the scope of the Product Liability Directive, it is acknowledged that for the purposes 
of product liability software should be perceived as a product.102 According to the Product Liability Di-
rective, which has been transposed into national laws, any person in the supply chain can be held liable 
and requested to compensate victims for any personal injury or damage caused to private property 
caused wholly or in part by a defect of a product. In such cases the plaintiff does not have to prove 
negligence on the part of the producer, but only that it is was defective and the damage occurred be-
cause there was causality between the defect and damage.103 This in practice means that the EU has 
opted in for a strict liability regime for which no proof of fault is necessary. At the same time, it should 
be noted that in circumstances where a product leads to a pure economic loss or infringement of indi-
viduals’ right, the strict liability regime may not be invoked as the damage should occur to a person or 
to a private property. Furthermore, the Product Liability Directive in Article 7 foresees that there are 
several situations in which the producer’s liability can be avoided.104 The European Parliament has re-
cently noted that in the context of Internet of Things (IoT), ‘tightening up liability regimes’ would be 
desirable as it could ‘lead to a better quality of products and a more secure environment’.105  
It is also argued that a new approach to the liability framework that could provide individuals with com-
prehensive and meaningful protection of their security, including the protection of their personal data, 
is needed.106 The new approach, proposed by Daley, would require to 1) balance ex ante incentives to 
invest in security with ex post liability 2) incentivize software developers to publicly disclose source code, 
3) promote trust and public confidence in embedded systems. 107 It seems that this approach, though 
being controversial, could help to develop ‘high-quality, affordable, interoperable and trustworthy cy-
bersecurity products’ that EC has called for in June 2017.108 
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4.1.4 A Number of Individuals’ Rights Grows despite the Shortfall in Digital Skills 
Even though the 2015 Special Eurobarometer on Data Protection suggests that nine out of ten Europe-
ans appear to consider the protection of their personal information to be important, the great majority 
of the EU citizens lack digital literacy that would enable enforcement of their rights. More than 60 % of 
the respondents are not aware about national authorities that could help them to enforce their rights. 
Even though this number has been reducing, it should raise questions about the actual value of expand-
ing the number of data subjects’ rights in the GDPR. Additionally, the recent study (Digital Economy and 
Society Index) shows that while 79 % of Europeans go online regularly (at least once per week), 44 % of 
Europeans still do not have basic digital skills.109 Therefore, enhancing digital literacy and skills is of a 
particular importance in view of the existing and new rights that individuals are entitled to in the digital 
environment.  
For example, the GDPR (Article 20) introduced the right to data portability in order to provide individuals 
with more control over their personal data. This right would also allow mitigating the risk of vendor lock-
in. Some suggest that the right to data portability, which can be exercised by individuals, morphed out 
of the so called ‘data ownership’ debate concerning social media platforms. This right initially should 
have allowed individuals to move across platforms easier. In particular, it should have allowed moving, 
copying or transferring personal data as controllers should provide their data in ‘a structured, commonly 
used and machine-readable format’.110 As Article 29 Working Party explains, this right is much broader 
than the existing right to data access and it is expected that it will have a significant impact on market 
dynamics way beyond providers of social media platforms.111 At the same time, when being put to prac-
tice this right may expose personal data to cybersecurity risks during the transit or at the time it is at 
the disposal of individuals. If implemented without appropriate security measures, this right may facili-
tate cybercrime, in particular, social engineering and phishing attacks. 
4.1.5 Understanding and Guaranteeing Controllership of Data 
Controversy surrounding the debates on the notion of data controllership lays in the difficulty to attrib-
ute appropriate responsibilities for actors involved in the processing of personal data. Controllership of 
data may be difficult to determine and exercise due to complex data flows between and amongst the 
entities. For example, transparency obligations concerning notifications of data breaches and infor-
mation security incidents to relevant national authorities (e.g., DPAs and CERT), may result in infor-
mation exchange over which affected entities may have little knowledge and control. 
The GDPR further advances debates on data controllership by 1) clarifying the accountability principle 
(Article 24), 2) specifying and introducing new responsibilities of data processors (Article 28), 3) intro-
ducing the notion of joint controllership and 4) introducing new data subjects’ rights. The debate over 
the attribution of responsibility between the agents engaged in the processing of personal data. Despite 
regulatory attempts to clarify roles and responsibilities of each actor engaged in and affected by the 
processing, the debate on data controllership remains unresolved.  
In principle, the determination of who is a controller responsible for a particular processing operations, 
must always take into account the actual circumstances of the processing and the factual influence of 
the entity in question.112 Consequently, not all recipients of personal data are controllers. Rather, in 
cases where another entity determines purposes and means of the processing, the recipient could be a 
processor. Nonetheless both, controller(s) and processor(s) are obliged by the GDPR to ensure the pro-
tection of personal information. In case of a possible non-compliance with the GDPR requirements, the 
affected data subject or a not-for-profit body, organisation or association mandated by a data subject 
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or the Member State (Article 80) can turn to a supervisory authority in order to hold controller(s) and 
the processor(s) liable. In case an infringement is determined, the data subject can demand compensa-
tion for material or non-material damage suffered (Article 82).  
Debates over data controllership should not be confused with debates on data ownership and data 
localisation initiatives, which gained fresh prominence with Snowden revelations. The data ownership 
debate questions ‘Who does own the data?’ and considers possibilities to monetize personal data. This 
debate is shaped by the list of EU regulatory measures governing trade secrecy, intellectual property, 
data protection and consumer protection rights.113 Whereas data localisation initiatives typically build 
on the ideas that information security and better protection of individuals’ fundamental right to data 
protection could be attained if data are not sent outside the EU (or a particular country).114 This ap-
proach can create new opportunities for businesses adhering to the EU data protection standards and 
operating on the EU soil. At the same time, it may have a negative impact on EU attempts to cooperate 
with third countries on cybersecurity affairs.  
4.1.6 Enforcement of copyright  
Challenges of copyright enforcement online is an illustrative example of controversies brought by digit-
isation to traditional forms of infringements. While cultural, innovation and creative sectors continue to 
rely on protection offered by intellectual property rights in order to protect their creative work as well 
as financial investments, the copyright enforcement online has become a part of the wider debate on 
the Internet governance. Copyright protection on the Internet is a huge challenge: how to enforce in-
tellectual property rights (IPRs) when their infringements are so widespread? Can and under what con-
ditions intermediaries and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) be held liable for their users’ behaviour? 
Whereas some would like to reduce or even abolish copyright, rights holders strive to strengthen copy-
right protection and enforce it by all means, including through the criminal law. ‘[D]ifficult questions 
arise as to the correct balance to be achieved between protecting the rights of the right holder, on the 
one hand, and protecting other interests such as the internal market or individual rights, such as freedom 
of information, on the other.[…] In addition, … copyright protection in the digital age cannot be divorced 
from matters such as ‘Internet freedom’ not least because there is considerable potential for obligations 
to be placed on Internet subscribers or Internet service provider (ISPs) to ensure that Internet connections 
are not used to infringe intellectual property. […] In short, as soon as the focus moves away from com-
mercial activities and towards the practices of individuals, the criminalisation of copyright infringement 
becomes controversial.’115 
The CJEU on several occasions engaged in the balancing exercise of economic interests, in particular the 
right to protection of intellectual property rights, and human rights in the online environment. In the 
case of Scarlet Extended, the CJEU concluded that an obligation for ISPs to install filtering software in 
order to conduct blanket searches for unlawful content is in breach of both EU data protection rules and 
freedom of expression online as such software might have blocked lawful communication.116 The same 
was confirmed in SABAM v. Netlog NV, in which the CJEU found that ‘owners of social networking sites 
cannot be obliged to install general filtering systems to cover all their users, even if these filtering systems 
would be effective in preventing the unlawful use of copyrighted material’.117 In both cases the CJEU 
favoured data protection rules, the freedom to conduct business and the freedom to receive or impart 
information and framed intellectual property rights in a narrow fashion.118  
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4.1.7 Regulating Online Content 
Freedom to opinion and freedom to expression are often stifled, even though the internet is predomi-
nantly considered to be an empowering medium that allows individuals to exercise their fundamental 
rights and freedoms. On frequent basis, actions of diverse stakeholders engaged in the internet govern-
ance undermine the enjoyment of freedom to opinion and freedom to expression. Internet content 
suppression (ICS) is a key form in which infringements and interferences with the two freedoms mani-
fest. Ever more sophisticated technologies ease the implementation of online content regulation 
measures, such as ICS.  Nonetheless, ‘to be in compliance with human rights, ICS requires careful bal-
ancing of public and private interests with freedom of expression’119. Consequently, content regulation 
online is a controversial subject.120 ‘The determination of what constitutes ‘criminal’ as opposed to ‘law-
ful’ content depends to a large extent on the political and cultural context in which issues such as cen-
sorship, freedom of expression and more broadly the relationship between the individual and the gov-
ernment are determined.’121 For more information about controversies surrounding the term ‘cyber-
crime’, consult Annex III, section 2 and its subsections. 
EU policy distinguishes between harmful content and illegal content. ‘Illegal content is considered obvi-
ously and universally unlawful, whereas the decision about whether content is ‘harmful’ or not is consid-
ered to depend on ‘cultural differences’’.122 But even illegal content stirs controversy. ‘Some offences, 
notably those relating to child pornography, are widely accepted as necessary even though questions 
remain as to their scope, while others, such as some of the provisions on terrorist offences are the subject 
of considerable controversy both as regards their desirability in the first place and their extent.’123 Di-
rective 2011/93/EU defines a child as any person below the age of 18 years124, although young people 
under 18 already have sexual consent in all EU countries except Malta. Child pornography includes ‘not 
only pornographic material involving actual children, but also pornographic material involving adults 
who look like children (youthful adult pornography) and computer-generated pornographic material in-
volving children, although not created using any actual children (virtual-child pornography).’125 Some 
argue that ‘these broad provisions, which seem to test the boundaries of the criminal law, will neverthe-
less prove difficult to reconcile with constitutionally protected notions of free speech and the presump-
tion of innocence. (…) ‘The emphasis shifted from protecting children from harm to attacking possession 
itself.’126 Others question the legal certainty of youthful-adult pornography: ‘[w]hether or not a person 
of age appears as a minor cannot be described legally. (…) This criterion will not lead to foreseeable 
results and is not suitable for the use in criminal law provisions.’127 
4.1.8 Regulating Encryption 
The issue of encryption has been discussed in different contexts in the EU. Encryption is considered to 
be one of the security measures within the scope of EU data protection framework128 and it is widely 
embraced by academics129 and the prominent actors within the cybersecurity domain, such as ENISA 
and EDPS.130 However, Member States, especially the ones that have recently suffered terrorist attacks, 
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take a different view on encryption in the context of the fight against crime.131 The Council of the EU, 
driven by Member States’ initiatives ran a questionnaire on ‘obstacles faced by law enforcement author-
ities when gathering or securing encrypted e-evidence for the purposes of criminal proceedings’ in 
2016.132 This questionnaire had to facilitate further discussions on the common European approach on 
the use of encryption. It found that ‘encryption is encountered often or almost always in the context of 
criminal investigations’ and that encryption challenges are encountered ‘both with regard to online (in 
the form of encrypted emails or other forms of e-communication and/or commercial applications such 
as Facebook, Skype, WhatsApp or Telegram) and offline encryption (most often criminal investigation 
involving encrypted digital devices and encrypting applications)’.133 In order to overcome such chal-
lenges, law enforcement and intelligence services advocate for the creation of means allowing to circum-
vent security solutions that cryptography provides. This in essence would require the development of a 
backdoor, which would allow for a third party to ‘have a mechanism to independently and without the 
knowledge of the sending or receiving party decrypt the communication’. 134 In response to this call, 
ENISA noted that ‘limiting the use of cryptographic tools will create vulnerabilities that can in turn be 
used by terrorists and criminals, and lower trust in electronic services, which will eventually damage 
industry and civil society in the EU’.135 It also encouraged exploration of other procedural approaches 
that would facilitate the judicial process.136  
The intense discussions on encryption regulation were put on halt for a few months but they resurfaced 
with the European Parliament’s amendments to a draft ePrivacy Regulation. One of the proposed 
amendments requires that ‘in order to safeguard security and integrity of networks and services, the use 
of end-to-end encryption should be promoted and, where necessary, be mandatory in accordance with 
the principles of security and privacy by design’. 137 If adopted during the legislative negotiation pro-
cesses, this provision would also forbid Member States from imposing ‘any obligation on encryption 
providers, on providers of electronic communications services or on any other organisations (at any level 
of the supply chain) that would result in the weakening of the security of their networks and services, 
such as the creation or facilitation of "backdoors".’138 It remains to be seen how this debate unfolds in 
the near future and whether ENISA’s and EDPS’ warning that installing backdoors to devices or encryp-
tion schemas in order to identify criminals and terrorists would impinge on security of all devices and 
applications that include encryption, is taken into consideration. 139 
4.1.9 Permissibility of Massive and Generalised Surveillance of Individuals 
Another key controversy in the area of cybersecurity is the extent to which the massive and generalised 
surveillance of individuals is permissible, and more specifically whether it is compatible with the require-
ments of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU has launched several large-scale IT systems, 
namely, the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Customs Information System 
(CIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), the Internal Market Information System (IMI), and a large da-
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tabase of fingerprints of applicants for asylum and irregular immigrants found within the EU (Euro-
dac).140 All of these systems fall under EDPS supervision and they have separate legal bases, content and 
architecture of their IT systems. The massive processing of information about individuals is a distinctive 
feature of these large-scale IT systems – understood in a broad manner as EU security measures. It has 
been suggested that EU attempts to strengthen external border controls and the development of these 
large scale IT systems allowed the EU to move from ‘border control’ to ‘border security’, with the latter 
being directly linked to counterterrorism.141 Border-related security initiatives have been considered to 
intensify surveillance in a manner that is at odds with the concept of the EU as a borderless area, leading 
to the paradoxical situation of an area without frontiers but with more controls, in which the abolition 
of (internal) borders seems to prompt the emergence of new forms of control.142 The EU has recently 
revised legal frameworks governing its large scale IT systems. 
However, not all surveillance systems are acceptable in the EU. In this sense, the Data Retention Directive 
concerning the retention of traffic and location data of all subscribers for the purpose of investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime can be recalled. The Directive required communications 
providers to store metadata (i.e., information about their source, destination, date, time and location) 
for the period of time ranging from six months to two years. The Directive was annulled as the CJEU 
took a view that it ‘entails an interference with the fundamental rights of practically the entire European 
population because it concerns all persons and all means of electronic communication. […] [Therefore,] 
the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality in 
the light of Articles 7, 8, and 52(1) of the Charter’.143 In a similar vein, the CJEU concluded that ‘legislation 
permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic com-
munications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for pri-
vate life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter’ in Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commis-
sioner case that led to the annulment of the Safe Harbour Agreement allowing for the transfer of per-
sonal data to the United States.144 The other interesting case untangling security issues form the pro-
tection of fundamental rights is Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In this case, the CJEU concluded 
that the legitimate interest basis does not justify personal data collection of anyone who accesses a web-
site for the purposes of security and continuous proper functioning of that website.145  
4.1.10 Fighting Terrorism 
Most of the EU’s counter-terrorism measures that are legally binding, such as directives, framework de-
cisions, decisions and international agreements, are mostly ‘crisis-driven’.146 Even though these 
measures have an adverse effect on the rights and values proclaimed in the EU Charter, they have proved 
to be of little help for law enforcement authorities and intelligence services in the fight against terror-
ism.147 Consequently, the EU’s counter-terrorism measures, especially the ones that extend to the online 
environment, are subject to rigorous criticism. The perception of Internet within the scope of debates 
concerning the fight of terrorism differs greatly from other areas. In this context, the internet is no 
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longer considered to be the medium facilitating the implementation of human rights, instead it is per-
ceived as a source of ‘information on terrorist means and methods’ such as amount to a ‘virtual training 
camp’.’148  
Directive (EU) 2017/541149 further reaffirms a view point that the internet can ‘inspire and mobilise local 
terrorist networks and individuals’ and it includes the ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’ 
among offences related to terrorist activities (Art. 5) 150 This offence ‘has been subject to considerable 
criticism both because of its wide scope and because of uncertainty about the commitment to funda-
mental human rights guarantees, notably freedom of expression. The definition of ‘terrorist offence’ is 
undeniably broad and this breadth is expanded further by the definition of provocation which does not 
require that the speech actually results in a terrorist act, only that the speech ‘causes a danger’ that an 
offence may be committed.’151 In this area ‘the focus of the EU has been very much on holding individual 
users liable rather than on imposing liability on service or host providers. This is partly a consequence of 
worries about allowing governments to censor the Internet and partly due to the practical and financial 
burdens that would accompany demands that providers monitor all content before it is posted.’152 For 
more information on issues concerning the area of freedom, security and justice, consult Annex III.  
 
4.2 Embedding Value-driven Cybersecurity in Legislation and Beyond 
Adhering to the EU Charter requires embedding its values into the applicable regulatory framework. But 
putting this to practice is not a straightforward task when it comes to development and implementation 
of EU legislation or policies. The embedment process entails a comprehensive understanding of ‘the val-
ues of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’153 as well as a thorough understanding of 
the regulatory field, such as cybersecurity. The possession of expertise in both areas by one individual 
and even one organisation is rare and consequently, the embedment process requires a proactive in-
volvement, action and collaboration of different stakeholders. The embedment of EU values enshrined 
in the EU Charter can take place both on an ex ante and an ex post basis. 154 
The EU institutions that are exercising a legislative power, namely the European Commission, the Coun-
cil of EU and the European Parliament, as well as EU agencies can play an important role in this regard 
on an ex ante basis. 155 For example, the European Commission (and to some extent the European Par-
liament) has developed good practices of carrying out compatibility checks and impact assessments of 
legislative proposals. It is believed that a combination of a fundamental rights compatibility check and 
the inclusion of fundamental rights in impact assessments, allows the Commission to mitigate the risk 
that its proposed measures violate fundamental rights.156 The knowledge generated during this process 
then can ‘guide the decision-making process to ensure that the course of action that will best support 
the fulfilment of fundamental rights will be chosen’. 157 The importance of these tools is challenged dur-
ing the legislative process, in particular, by amendments that entail considerable changes to a proposed 
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text and relate to the protection of fundamental rights.158 In the domain of cybersecurity, opinions and 
contributions of the specialised EU bodies, such as EDPS, ENISA and the Article 29 Working Party, proved 
to be useful and allowed overcoming the limitations of initial compatibility checks and impact assess-
ments.  
The participatory dimension can also facilitate the integration of EU values into regulatory frameworks 
and policies. For example, during the drafting stage of legislative proposals, the European Commission 
usually launches a public consultation process in order to unveil the key issues faced by the concerned 
stakeholders. In fact, the European Commission carries a duty to conduct ‘broad consultations with par-
ties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent’.159 Based on the 
inputs received during the public consultation process, the European Commission has to propose 
measures that would not only balance different interests of stakeholders but that also would be com-
patible with values enshrined in the EU Charter. The concerned stakeholders remain active after these 
consultations are closed and they provide comments on legislative proposals throughout different stages 
of legislative process. Some organisations, in particular, the ones representing civil society groups, often 
provide detailed analyses of how a future legislative measure could better implement provisions of the 
EU Charter.160 However, for these analyses to be taken into account by legislators, the concerned stake-
holders need to run lobbying campaigns. 
Apart from compatibility checks, impact assessments of legislative proposals and stakeholders’ partici-
pation, legislators can choose emphasising certain values in the legislative text. For example, the GDPR 
introduced the principle of data protection by design (DPbD) in Article 25.1. This principle explicitly re-
quires controllers of personal data processing activities to implement technical and organisational 
measures that would be appropriate to the level of risks that may arise from the processing activities 
for rights and freedoms of individuals’ whose data are being processed.161 These measures should en-
sure that the requirements and principles of the GDPR are embedded in the processing activity from its 
inception as well revised and updated throughout the data processing activity. This principle represents 
an interesting legislative technique as it in practice reinforces the obligations that are listed in Article 5 
of the GDPR specifying the principles of personal data processing (previously found in Article 6 of the 
Data Protection Directive). 
Finally, it seems that even though EU institutional set up allows challenging measures that are not com-
patible with EU values,162 more could be done in order to embody EU values in legislative frameworks 
and policies. It is believed that ‘a permanent, rather than a one-time, assessment of fundamental rights 
compatibility of EU legislation’ as well as ‘the establishment of a mechanism to systematically screen 
developments in the Union in order to identify the need to take action at EU level in order to protect and 
fulfill the rights, freedoms and principles of the Charter’ would enhance compliance with values embed-
ded in the EU Charter. 163  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This White Paper explored the notions of ‘value-driven’ and ‘cybersecurity’ from the perspective of EU 
law. In relation to values, it has highlighted the significance of those listed in the Treaty of EU, namely 
‘respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights’.164 These values need to be considered within both internal and external EU policies, and may 
legitimise the expansion of EU competencies and consequently, the adoption of new regulatory 
measures.165 Nevertheless, their interpretation, respect and promotion by EU institutions and Member 
States is not always uncontested.  
The main challenges of cybersecurity regulation include the ambiguous use of the term ‘cybersecurity’, 
cooperation of stakeholders and securitisation of EU values and interests. The ambiguous use of the 
term ‘cybersecurity’ leads to open ended understanding of the regulatory area, which may provide EU 
legislature with flexibility about issues that can be placed under this ‘umbrella’ term. At the same time, 
measures adopted in the name of (cyber)security may fall outside the EU competence. 
In order to attain objectives set by 2013 EU Cybersecurity Strategy, cooperation between different 
stakeholders is crucial. For cooperation to be successful different actors should not only be assigned 
clear roles and responsibilities but they should also be accountable and transparent about their prac-
tices and areas of expertise. The coordination of cooperation remains challenging as it includes numer-
ous public and private stakeholders at EU and national level spread across the following domains 1) 
network and information security, 2) electronic communications, and 3) criminal justice. Lastly, with the 
surge of technology use in a wide range of areas, legitimate concerns are raised about information se-
curity. As the European Commission has pointed out, there are different scenarios which would allow 
Member States to pool their industrial and technical resources. While currently cybersecurity issues are 
addressed via Security and Defence Cooperation, careful reading of its policy documents implies that 
the EC has a preference for the Common Defence and Security. The choice of the latter would entail a 
change in EU competence, which may require citizens’ approval in some countries. 
The White Paper discusses ten controversies over EU value-driven cybersecurity regulation, even 
though more controversies, reflecting self-defeating strategies, could be established. First, numerous 
EU policy measures that address cybersecurity issues also recognise that any measures taken with re-
spect to the protection of security of information infrastructures have to be developed ‘in accordance 
with the commitment of the European Union to respect fundamental human rights’.166 Nevertheless, 
there are cases where EU policy measures and legislation do not adhere to principles established in EU 
fundamental rights. Hopefully, with the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty and the recognition of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights these situations are avoided or reduced to minimum. Second, in order 
to address and mitigate information security risks, EU regulatory measures rely on proactive individuals 
and companies who are able to identify risks and act upon them, even though information risks are 
difficult to quantify, constantly changing and require a certain level of expertise. The current approach 
of relying on individuals and companies may not be the most effective way to tackle information risks. 
Third, attribution of roles to different stakeholders is desirable but in some situations, clearly defined 
roles of actors may reduce the scope of law. Fourth, individuals are being awarded with more rights 
despite they often lack digital literacy over their existing rights and their enforcement mechanisms. 
Fifth, the notions of data controllership and ownership have recently resurfaced in discussions about 
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data policies, in particular at European level. While arguably data controllership or ownership may en-
sure the better quality of information, in practice, it is a formidable task due to data fluidity. Sixth, en-
forcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs), in particular, a copy right protection, remains highly 
contested. Seventh, as notions of ‘criminal’, lawful’, ‘harmful’ and ‘illegal’ content are often locked to 
the political and cultural context, there is little agreement among the Member States about online con-
tent regulation. Eighth, even though there is an emerging agreement that installing backdoors to devices 
or encryption schemas in order to identify criminals and terrorists would reduce security among aca-
demics and EU agencies, issues related to encryption are subjected to heated discussions at the EU 
institutions. Ninth, even though the EU has set up several large-scale IT systems that facilitate surveil-
lance of individuals, it has a clear vision over which massive and generalised surveillance can be accepta-
ble in the EU. Finally, the EU recently penalised terrorist offences in Directive (EU) 2017/541, which has 
received criticism both because of its wide scope and because of uncertainty about the commitment to 
fundamental human rights guarantees, notably freedom of expression.  
The discussion over controversies demonstrated that values stemming from the EU Charter play an im-
portant role in the EU regulatory approach in the cybersecurity domain, even though they are contested 
by EU institutions, Member States and interests of stakeholders. The White Paper pointed out that a 
strong emphasis put on the protection and promotion of fundamental rights form a unique and distinc-
tive EU approach to cybersecurity. However, for protection of fundamental rights to become an estab-
lished principle in the cybersecurity domain, the EU has to consistently advocate for it in its internal and 
external measures. It seems that even though EU institutional set up allows attaining this consistency 
by allowing various actors to challenge measures that are not compatible with EU values throughout 
different stages of development and implementation of legislation and policies.  
While a permanent assessment of fundamental rights compatibility of EU legislation as well as the sys-
tematic screening of developments concerning the protection of the rights, freedoms and principles of 
the EU Charter would enhance compliance with values embedded in the EU Charter, there are more 
ways to embed EU values in legislative frameworks and policies. Perhaps, the most interesting proposal 
in this regard entails developing new legislative techniques, such as demonstrated by the data protec-
tion by design principle, which further strengthens obligations stemming from the GDPR. Indeed, a more 
accentuated use of existing measures and principles, stemming from EU values, for example, the imple-
mentation of appropriate security measures, as required by the EU data protection framework, may 
benefit the overall cybersecurity.  
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Annex 1: Review of EU Soft-law Measures 
Addressing Cybersecurity 
 
With more information vanishing into cyberspace, the use of term ‘cybersecurity’ has dramatically in-
creased. Policy makers, regulators, activists, business representatives, journalists and ordinary citizens 
– all have an opinion on how best to address this issue. We have prepared this annex with an aim to 
contribute to the ongoing discussion with regard to cybersecurity. In particular, we will try to explain 
how the term ‘cybersecurity’ has emerged in the EU. To this end, in this annex we will analyse numerous 
EU policy documents that have shaped this term. A better understanding of contexts and agendas in 
which this term has originated, can lead us to a greater understanding of the EU cybersecurity policy 
and its underlying objectives. 
The review presents EU policy documents, such as communications, Council resolutions and implemen-
tation reports that address issues of information systems and networks security. The reviewed docu-
ments cover the period of 2000-2016. The selected documents are presented in chronological order as 
this particular structure of the review allows tracking down the development of EU cybersecurity policy, 
including the emergence of the term ‘cybersecurity’. In order to find the first documents addressing 
issues related to cybersecurity, the authors relied on references included in policy documents to earlier 
documents, which are followed up, related or addressed similar issues. All of the reviewed documents 
are available in EU bibliographical databases and can be accessed on the Internet.  
The presidency conclusions of the Lisbon European Council (often referred to as the Lisbon Strategy) is 
one of the first high-level policy documents that paved the way for regulatory developments concerning 
the online environment. The Lisbon Strategy (Strategy) included a roadmap of key EU objectives. Ac-
cording to this roadmap, the EU had ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world’ by 2010.167 Among other objectives, the Lisbon Strategy aimed at ensuring that 
the EU information society can adapt to a knowledge-based digital economy, which was considered to 
be ‘a powerful engine for growth, competitiveness and jobs’.168 The Strategy observed that the EU has 
to find a way to modernise its social protection model in the context of emerging digital reality. In par-
ticular, the Strategy foresaw the need ‘to strengthen cooperation between Member States by exchang-
ing experiences and best practice on the basis of improved information networks which are the basic 
tools in this field’.169 While the Strategy focused on setting policies and appropriate legal frameworks 
for attaining ‘e-potential’ by accessible information technologies and advancement of digital skills, it 
invited the Council of the EU (Council) and the European Commission (Commission or EC) to develop a 
comprehensive eEurope Action Plan.  
The EC Communication ‘eEurope 2002: Impact and Priorities’ was an integral part of the Lisbon Strategy 
and further specified measures to be adopted and developed with a view to achieving the following 
three main objectives: 1) cheaper, faster and more secure Internet access, 2) increased investment in 
citizens’ digital skills, 3) and incentives for the use of the Internet.170 To enhance user confidence in the 
field of electronic commerce, the Action Plan proposed the following measures:  
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1. support industry-led security certifications through coordination of efforts and mutual recogni-
tion; 
2. promote privacy-enhancing technologies, including proper codes and the consolidation of prac-
tice; 
3. stimulate public/private cooperation on dependability of information infrastructures. 
In the eEurope Benchmarking Report - eEurope 2002, it was pointed out that ‘for computers and com-
munication networks everywhere, security has become a major concern. During the short period of 
eEurope, there has been a visible increase in threats and security incidents. Virus attacks in particular 
have become much more common’ whereas progress to improve protection against security threats 
was considered to be slow.171 
In this regard, the Communication titled ‘Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security 
of Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-related Crime’ can be seen as the first elaborate 
policy document focusing on cybersecurity issues. This communication recognized that ‘[i]nformation 
and communication infrastructures have become a critical part of [EU economy]’and called for ‘a com-
prehensive policy initiative’ that would allow enhancing the security of information infrastructures and 
combat cyber-crime.172  
This Communication posited that individuals play a crucial role with regard to information security. The 
Communication pointed out that ‘to an important extent [is] a responsibility of the users, as only they 
can appreciate the value of the bits being sent or received, and can determine the level of protection 
needed’. 173 The Communication, building on the observation of individuals’ deep involvement online, 
went further and suggested that ‘[t]he user environment is therefore a key part of the information in-
frastructure. Security techniques have to be implemented there with the permission and participation 
of the user and according to his/her needs.’174 
The Communication facilitated the establishment of an EU Forum on cybersecurity and cybercrime, yet 
it recognized that these different initiatives are not sufficient to provide for higher network security. 
Therefore, the Commission called for a more comprehensive framework, which at the time, due to the 
three-pillar structure of the EU, was rather provocative. Interestingly, the Communication has noted 
that any measures taken with respect to the protection of security of information infrastructures have 
to be developed ‘in accordance with the commitment of the European Union to respect fundamental 
human rights’.175 
The Communication titled ‘Network and Information Security: Proposal for A European Policy Approach’ 
was developed in a response to the request of the Stockholm European Council in 2001. The starting 
point of this Communication was the observation that ‘finding an adequate policy response is becoming 
an increasingly complex task’.176 This communication did not employ the term ‘cybersecurity’; rather, it 
focused on network and information security which, at that time, was ‘understood as the ability of a 
network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or malicious 
actions’.177 It can be suggested that when reflecting on security threats, the Communication lacked ev-
idence supporting its claims about any potential threats. For example, instead of elaborating on a par-
ticular type of threat or context in which security threat could occur, the Communication included bold 
sentences like this:  
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‘Companies relying on the network for sales or to organise delivery of supplies can be paralysed by a 
denial of service attack. Personal and financial information can be intercepted and abused. National 
security can be threatened.’178  
Nevertheless, the Communication is worth consideration as it proposed the list of measures to tackle 
security challenges:179 
- Awareness raising; 
- A European warning and information system (e.g., development of Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Teams (CERTs) and their co-ordination); 
- Technology support (e.g., support for research and development in EU funding schemes); 
- Support for market oriented standardisation and certification; 
- Legal framework; 
- Security in eGovernment (i.e., effective and interoperable security solutions in their e-govern-
ment and e-procurement activities); and 
- International co-operation. 
The Council issued several resolutions as a follow up of the EC communications and other initiatives. 
The Council Resolution ‘eEurope Action Plan: Information and Network Security’ elaborated further on 
EU goals with regards to information security and the digital environment. It stated that the Council 
together with the Commission should lay the ground for measures ensuring security (trustworthiness) 
of the digital environment. Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that information and network security is 
the ‘prerequisite for the widespread use of information and communication technologies’.180  
The Council Resolution on a common approach and specific actions in the area of network and infor-
mation security was published in early 2002. The Resolution stressed that information communication 
systems are not only of a significant economic and social importance but also their availability is at the 
essence of essential infrastructures.181 With this observation in mind, the Resolution argued that the 
protection of information systems is of a growing public interest and therefore, policy with specific 
measures has to developed to this end. These measures should be holistic and take into consideration 
the nature and complexity of network and information security as well as political, economic, organisa-
tional and technical aspects. The Resolution emphasised the need for more research activities on ‘secu-
rity mechanisms and their interoperability, network reliability and protection, advanced cryptography, 
privacy enhancement technologies and security in wireless communications’. 182 The Resolution explic-
itly referred to the international standards, namely ISO-15408 on Evaluation criteria for IT security and 
ISO-17799 on Information technology - Code of practice for information security management. Further-
more, with this Resolution the Council insisted that Member States take measures to promote adoption 
of these internationally recognised standards. The Resolution invited ‘private sector suppliers and ser-
vice providers and their representative groupings to participate more actively in international standard-
isation activities’. 183 It requested that both suppliers and service providers regard security ‘as an integral 
and essential part of their products and services’.184 Furthermore, the Resolution invited (i.e., asked) 
Member States to develop awareness raising and education campaigns for business, individual users 
and public administrations. In particular, the Resolution asked the Member States to consider the effec-
tiveness of national cybersecurity capabilities, such as ‘ability to prevent, detect, and react efficiently at 
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national and international level against network and information systems disruption and attack’.185  
In 2003 followed the Council Resolution on a European approach towards a culture of network and infor-
mation security. While the document was rather short, it allowed to further clarify the EU role within 
the domain of information security, often referred to as cybersecurity.  
The Resolution noted that a secure digital environment is instrumental for citizens, businesses and pub-
lic administrations as well as for the proper functioning of the Internal Market.186 The reference to the 
Internal Market is of great significance. As it will be demonstrated later, subsequently, it enabled further 
EU action and harmonization of Member States approaches in the cybersecurity context. 
While calling for a culture of network and information security, the Resolution invited both Member 
States and the EU institutions to work on a strategy for network and information security that would 
take into consideration international cooperation and good practices, such as the OECD Guidelines for 
the security of Information Systems and Networks. The Resolution echoed ideas of previous policy doc-
uments and noted that ‘a coherent security policy development at European level requires cross-pillar 
transparency and cooperation’.187 The Resolution, while recognizing that confidence (trustworthiness) 
of networks and information systems is of great importance for citizens and enterprises, encouraged 
employing a holistic view specifying responsibilities of all stakeholders. It invited all actors to take ade-
quate measures to respond and prevent security incidents. The Resolution welcomed actions initiated 
by the European Commission, namely, 188  
- the application of the open method of coordination 
- the set up a temporary interdisciplinary working group 
- the establishment of a Cyber-Security Task Force  
- building a dialogue with industry to improve security in the development of hardware and 
software products and ensure the availability of services and data; 
- the establishment contacts with relevant international partners and international organiza-
tions.  
Last but not least, the Resolution emphasized that regulatory and policy actions should take into con-
sideration and respect 1) democratic values, 2) the importance of personal data protection, and 3) pri-
vacy rights.189  
In 2005 the Commission, published the Communication ‘i2010 – A European Information Society for 
growth and employment.’ This Communication for the first time included more precise estimations of 
the ICT impact on the European society. In particular, the Communication claimed that ‘a quarter of EU 
GDP growth and 40% of productivity growth are due to ICT’.190 The Communication also recognized that 
‘[i]nformation and communication technologies are a powerful driver of growth and employment’.191 
The Communication outlined an action plan to meet the following three objectives: 
- Objective 1: A Single European Information Space offering affordable and secure high band-
width communications, rich and diverse content and digital services.  
- Objective 2: World class performance in research and innovation in ICT by closing the gap with 
Europe’s leading competitors.  
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- Objective 3: An Information Society that is inclusive, provides high quality public services and 
promotes quality of life.  
This Communication introduced terms that still dominate debates on cybersecurity regulation, namely: 
‘trustworthy, secure and reliable’. It can be suggested that by invoking these terms, the Commission 
recognised that the understanding of ICT is dynamic and changes over time. From the primary focus on 
security, the attention has shifted to other characteristics and qualities of the ICT, namely trustworthi-
ness and reliability. The Communication foresaw the adoption of a Strategy for a Secure Information 
Society that would to lead to changes in a legislative framework and awareness campaigns. The Com-
munication also explained in greater detail the EC’s commitment to foster research and innovation ef-
forts that would ‘design-in’ security and facilitate deployment of measures that test solutions for key 
issues such as identity management.192 In order to establish ‘a consistent internal market framework for 
information society and media services’, the Communication noted that it is necessary to review legis-
lative frameworks applicable to protection of privacy, electronic signature or discouraging illegal and 
harmful content. 193  
In 2006 the Communication ‘Strategy for a Secure Information Society – Dialogue, partnership and em-
powerment’ was published. This Communication not only outlined more specific measures that the EU 
was going to take but it also placed the debates on the ICT security within a wider context. In particular, 
the Communication stressed that the EU has an important role to play within the scope of debates 
taking place at international level, for example, at the OECD, the Council of Europe or the UN. To further 
advance the discussions at international level, it was necessary to develop a common understanding of 
the issues of Internet security. Indeed, the EU (as a unit representing 28 countries) may have a stronger 
impact in international debates considering fight against cybercrime and spam while ensuring the pro-
tection of privacy and freedom of expression.  
The Communication noted that ‘effective policy making needs a clear understanding of the nature and 
extent of the challenges’.194 The ambition to understand these challenges is to a large extent reflected 
in the EU response to security challenges, which has resulted in ‘a three-pronged’ approach including:  
- specific network and information security measures,  
- the regulatory framework for electronic communications (which includes privacy and data 
protection issues), and  
- the regulatory framework for the fight against cybercrime.195 
The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy was published in 2008. While fol-
lowing on the previous actions of the European Security Strategy developed back in 2003, the Report 
expanded the list of security challenges to the EU. In particular, the Report regarded information sys-
tems and energy supply as the vulnerable ‘arteries of our society’.196 The Report noted that ‘globalisa-
tion is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values’.197 The Report concluded that 
the EU should develop a comprehensive approach tackling cyber security issues. The Report reasoned 
the EU should go beyond criminalisation of unlawful activities and consider new dimensions of cyber 
security that relate to economy, policy and military. Additionally, the Report stressed the need for fur-
ther work with regards to awareness raising and international co-operation.198  
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The Stockholm Program: An open and secure Europe serving the citizens can be considered to be a more 
thorough follow up of the European Security Strategy. The European Council with this document set a 
framework for the EU action outside the first pillar structure for the period of 2010 – 2014. The Program 
tackled issues related to citizenship, justice, security, asylum, immigration and visa policy. This Program 
claimed that ‘[t]he challenge will be to ensure respect for fundamental freedoms and integrity while 
guaranteeing security in Europe’.199 The Program observed that on political level it is necessary to de-
velop mutually reinforcing measures. To this end, the Program suggested that ‘law enforcement 
measures and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law, international protection rules go 
hand in hand in the same direction’.200 The Program focused on protecting citizen’s rights in the infor-
mation society and proclaimed that the EU carries a duty to ‘respond to the challenge posed by the 
increasing exchange of personal data and the need to ensure the protection of privacy’. 201 In particular, 
the Program insisted that the EU develops ‘a comprehensive strategy to protect data within the EU and 
in its relations with other countries’, while promoting the application of the principles set out in relevant 
EU instruments on data protection and the 1981 Council of Europe Convention on data protection.202 
Additionally, the Program stressed that the EU has to specify situations in which interference by public 
authorities with the exercise of these rights is justified. Data protection principles must be also applica-
ble in the private sphere. Furthermore, the Program concluded that ‘[b]asic principles such as purpose 
limitation, proportionality, legitimacy of processing, limits on storage time, security and confidentiality 
as well as respect for the rights of the individual, control by national independent supervisory authori-
ties, and access to effective judicial redress need to be ensured and a comprehensive protection scheme 
must be established.’203 Finally, the European Council was of an opinion that ‘the Union must address 
the necessity for increased exchange of personal data whilst ensuring the utmost respect for the pro-
tection of privacy’.204 From the statements provided in the Program it can be suggested that the Euro-
pean Council is a techno-optimist. It considers that technological advancements not only pose chal-
lenges to the protection of personal data but also provide for new ways to run business and protect 
personal data.  
Another important aspect of the Program was mobilising the necessary technological tools, as well as 
the legislative framework ensuring a high level of network and information security protection, including 
protection of critical infrastructures, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and services in-
frastructure. The Program insists that the EU encourages ‘policies and legislation that ensure a very high 
level of network security and allow faster reactions in the event of cyber disruptions or cyber attacks’. 
These tools and measures should ensure that people are safe, secure and free. In summary, it can be 
claimed that while the European Council regarded the protection of network information systems and 
the fight against cyber-crime as two separate elements to the overall security of the EU, in both cases 
any measures developed in the context of these frameworks should reinforce the exercise of citizens’ 
rights, in particular the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. The Program called for a 
coherent policy response which goes beyond the area of freedom, security and justice. 
Despite all the effort and measures tackling information security challenges, these measures were con-
sidered in isolation and a more coherent approach with regard to information communication systems 
was necessary. To this end, the Communication published ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’ in 2010. The 
starting point of this document was the observation that ‘[p]eople’s enjoyment of digital technologies, 
be it as citizens, consumers or workers, is marked by privacy and security concerns, by insufficient in-
ternet access, insufficient usability, by lack of relevant skills or by lack of accessibility for all’.205 The 
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Communication was of opinion that ‘a lack of trust in the online environment is meanwhile seriously 
hampering the development of Europe's online economy’.206 Indeed, people who did not purchase 
online were reported to have concerns over: payment security, privacy, and trust.  
The Communication devoted a section addressing issues related to trust and security. The Communica-
tion insisted that [u]sers must be safe and secure when they connect online and therefore criminal 
activities, motivated by financial or political purposes, including identity theft and online fraud, in the 
digital space should not be acceptable. Yet addressing these challenges was considered to be a shared 
responsibility – everyone has a role to play within their respective capacity. One of the reasons to revise 
the framework for electronic communications was the pressing need to clarify roles and the responsi-
bilities of network operators as well as service providers. 
The Communication explicitly noted that ‘[t]he right to privacy and to the protection of personal data 
are fundamental rights in the EU which must be – also online - effectively enforced using the widest 
range of means: from the wide application of the principle of ‘Privacy by Design’ in the relevant ICT 
technologies, to dissuasive sanctions wherever necessary.’ 207 
The Communication integrated the protection of critical information infrastructure and the agenda for 
freedom, security and justice, set forth by the Stockholm Program: An open and secure Europe serving 
the citizen. The Communication used the term cybersecurity only when discussing information security 
aspects from the international perspective. 
Given the fast pace of technological developments, the list of actions was revised in 2012. The Digital 
Agenda - Driving European growth digitally did not further advance discussions on the issues related to 
cybersecurity. The Digital Agenda 2012 advocated for the development of measures ‘fostering a secure 
and trustworthy internet environment for users and operators, based on strengthened European and 
international collaboration in responding to global risks’.208 In particular, it paved the way for the adop-
tion of the Directive that would strengthen network and information security across the EU and ensure 
the smooth functioning of the internal market. The Digital Agenda 2012 employed the typical language 
for trust and security rather than cybersecurity.  
It is noteworthy that the term ‘cybersecurity’ in its more comprehensive sense to the EU discussions 
(i.e., going beyond cybercrime) was brought in after 2013. It can be suggested that the Digital Agenda 
for Europe Scoreboard 2012 and the Special Eurobarometer study ‘Cyber security’ were among the first 
documents that introduced cybersecurity as a broader term covering various issues related to the digital 
environment. The Digital Agenda for Europe Scoreboard 2012 observed that ‘[c]ybersecurity is rising in 
prominence as a major policy challenge. Cooperation in this field has been strengthened, for example 
through the European Forum for Member States and the European Public-Private Partnership for Resil-
ience as well as by the establishment of national/governmental CERTs (computer emergency response 
teams) in 23 Member States.’209 The Special Eurobarometer study examined EU citizens’ experiences 
and perceptions of cyber security issues.210 In the context of the survey, cyber security was used as a 
phrase capturing citizens’ behaviour and actions online. 
A comprehensive EU Cybersecurity Strategy was published in 2013. Following up on this document, in 
2015 the Commission published the Communication on A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe. This 
document further strengthened EU claims for competences to regulate the cybersecurity domain in 
earlier policy documents. In particular, the 2015 Digital Single Market Strategy, which reasoned that be-
cause of the potential impact that lack of trustworthiness in services provided online has on the EU 
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economy, ‘[a] more joined-up approach is therefore needed to step up the supply of more secure solu-
tions by EU industry and to stimulate their take-up by enterprises, public authorities, and citizens’.211 
Providing an effective legal framework with regards to the protection of the EU fundamental rights as a 
well as law enforcement activities has been recognised as a priority. To this end, the Commission pro-
posed updating the existing legal framework governing the protection of privacy and personal data and 
setting up a public-private partnership on cybersecurity.  
The European Agenda on Security was also published in 2015. Interestingly, the term of cybersecurity in 
this document differs from the Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe as cybersecurity is considered 
to be ‘the first line of defence against cybercrime’.212 This document anticipated that the Directive on 
network and information security will enhance cooperation between different competent authorities 
addressing cybersecurity issues (i.e., law enforcement and cybersecurity authorities). More specifically 
this Agenda foreseen the following action points: 
- emphasise the implementation of existing policies on cybersecurity, attacks against information 
systems, and combatting child sexual exploitation;  
- consider extending legislation on combatting fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payments to take account of newer forms of crime and counterfeiting in financial instruments; 
revision of obstacles to criminal investigations on cybercrime, notably on issues of competent 
jurisdiction and rules on access to evidence and information;  
- enhance cyber capacity building action under external assistance instruments.213  
The Commission Communication on Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System was published in 
2016. This Communication followed up on the previous policy documents, namely the EU Cybersecurity 
Strategy and the Digital Single Market Strategy. The Communication summarises the EU achievements 
within the domain of cybersecurity so far and outlines further measures increasing EU cyber resilience. 
The Communication brought the EU debates on cybersecurity further by considering ways to assess the 
risk and impact of potential large-scale cyber incident which may occur due to interdependence of cross-
border and cross-sectoral communication and information systems.214 
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Annex 2: EU Legislative Measures on  
Cybersecurity 
The table below provides an overview of existing EU legislative measures constituting EU cybersecurity 
framework. After introducing a regulatory measure, the following column considers if it has been re-
vised, amended or repealed. The last column of the table explains how each regulatory measure con-
tributes to the domain of cybersecurity. 
 
No. Regulatory measure Updates and revisions Relation to cybersecurity 
1.  Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 Octo-
ber 1995 on the protec-
tion of individuals with re-
gard to the processing of 
personal data and on the 
free movement of such 
data  
 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and re-
pealing Directive 95/46/EC 
Requires Member States to ensure 
controllers and processors to imple-
ment appropriate technical and or-
ganizational measures to protect per-
sonal data against accidental or un-
lawful destruction or accidental loss, 
alteration, unauthorized disclosure 
or access, in particular where the 
processing involves the transmission 
of data over a network, and against 
all other unlawful forms of pro-
cessing. 
2.  Directive 2002/58/EC of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 12 
July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal 
data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic 
communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and 
electronic communica-
tions) 
Directive 2009/136/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directive 2002/22/EC 
on universal service and users’ 
rights relating to electronic com-
munications networks and ser-
vices, Directive 2002/58/EC con-
cerning the processing of per-
sonal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic commu-
nications sector and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 on coopera-
tion between national authori-
ties responsible for the enforce-
ment of consumer protection 
laws 
Requires Member States to ensure 
that providers of a publicly available 
electronic communications service to 
take appropriate technical and or-
ganisational measures to safeguard 
security of their services, if necessary 
in conjunction with the provider of 
the public communications network 
with respect to network security.  
The same article requires providers 
of a publicly available electronic com-
munications service in case of a par-
ticular risk of a breach of the security 
of the network to inform the sub-
scribers concerning such risk and, 
where the risk lies outside the scope 
of the measures to be taken by the 
service provider, of any possible rem-
edies, including an indication of the 
likely costs involved. 
3.  Council Framework Deci-
sion 2004/68/JHA of 22 
December 2003 on com-
bating the sexual exploita-
tion of children and child 
pornography 
Directive 2011/92/EU of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 on 
combating the sexual abuse and 
sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography, and re-
placing Council Framework Deci-
sion 2004/68/JHA 
Foresees measures against websites 
containing or disseminating child 
pornography. In particular, this arti-
cle requires Member States to take 
the necessary measures to ensure 
the prompt removal of web pages 
containing or disseminating child 
pornography hosted in their territory 
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No. Regulatory measure Updates and revisions Relation to cybersecurity 
and to endeavour to obtain the re-
moval of such pages hosted outside 
of their territory. 
While Member States are allowed to 
take measures to block access to web 
pages containing or disseminating 
child pornography towards the Inter-
net users within their territory, these 
measures must be set by transparent 
procedures and provide adequate 
safeguards, in particular to ensure 
that the restriction is limited to what 
is necessary and proportionate, and 
that users are informed of the reason 
for the restriction.  
4.  Council Framework Deci-
sion 2005/222/JHA, OJ L 
69, 16/03/2005 on attacks 
against information sys-
tems 
Directive 2013/40/EU of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 August 2013 on at-
tacks against information sys-
tems and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA 
Requires Member States to take the 
necessary measures criminalising: 
- illegal access to information sys-
tems  
- illegal system interference  
- illegal data interference  
5.  Directive 2005/60/EC of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 
October 2005 on the pre-
vention of the use of the 
financial system for the 
purpose of money laun-
dering and terrorist fi-
nancing 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the 
prevention of the use of the fi-
nancial system for the purposes 
of money laundering or terrorist 
financing, amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the 
Council, and repealing Directive 
2005/60/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council and 
Commission Directive 
2006/70/EC (2015) 
Requires Member States to prohibit 
their credit and financial institutions 
from keeping anonymous accounts 
or anonymous passbooks; imposes 
customer due diligence obligations.  
6.  Council Framework Deci-
sion 2008/977/JHA of 27 
November 2008 on the 
protection of personal 
data processed in the 
framework of police and 
judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters 
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent au-
thorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detec-
tion or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and on the 
free movement of such data, and 
repealing Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA 
Requires Member States to take 
measures ensuring a high level of 
protection of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of natural persons, 
and in particular their right to pri-
vacy, with respect to the processing 
of personal data in the framework of 
police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. 
7.  Council Directive 
2008/114/EC on the iden-
tification and designation 
N/A - Establishes a procedure for the 
identification and designation of 
European critical infrastructures 
(‘ECIs’), and a common approach 
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No. Regulatory measure Updates and revisions Relation to cybersecurity 
of European Critical Infra-
structures and the assess-
ment of the need to im-
prove their protection 
to the assessment of the need to 
improve the protection of such in-
frastructures in order to contribute 
to the protection of people. 
- Requires ECIs to have the operator 
security plan (‘OSP’) procedure 
which identifies the critical infra-
structure assets of the ECI and 
which security solutions exist or 
are being implemented for their 
protection.  
8.  Commission Regulation 
No 611/2013 of 24 June 
2013 on the measures ap-
plicable to the notification 
of personal data breaches 
under Directive 
2002/58/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of 
the Council on privacy and 
electronic communica-
tions 
 Specifies a procedure for the notifi-
cation of personal data breaches by 
providers of publicly available elec-
tronic communications services.  
9.  Directive 2016/1148 of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council con-
cerning measures for a 
high common level of se-
curity of network and in-
formation systems across 
the Union 
 - Lays down measures with a view to 
achieving a high common level of 
security of network and infor-
mation systems within the Union 
so as to improve the functioning of 
the internal market. 
- Requires to take technical and or-
ganisational measures that are ap-
propriate and proportionate to 
manage and mitigate the risk 
posed to the security of network 
and information systems which 
they use in their operations. 
- Introduces auditing requirements 
for the taken measures. 
- Introduces a notification obligation 
of incidents having a significant im-
pact on the continuity of the es-
sential services they provide. 
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Annex 3: Cybersecurity and Criminal  
Justice  
This annex provides and overview of cybersecurity challenges and controversies within the EU criminal 
justice affairs. The fight against cybercrime constitutes an essential part of cybersecurity, although it 
addresses a limited subset of threats. As cybercrime is endangering our societies from the online world, 
criminal justice contributes to protect our assets and uphold our values in the cyberspace. Cybercrime 
is inseparable from criminal law since it is defined by the latter. But it is important to note that fighting 
against cybercrime is not merely a legal issue. The THOR concept presents four dimensions of the prob-
lem: (T)echnical, (H)uman, (O)rganisational, and (R)egulatory, the regulatory dimension being “related 
to law provisioning, standardisation and forensics”.215 
In this section on cybersecurity and criminal justice, we will begin with a state-of-the-art review of the 
current legislation and legal mechanisms. Then we will turn to the numerous challenges and controver-
sies. Finally, we will reflect on the EU values at stake and their dynamics.216 Our discussion will focus on 
the legislation common to all Member States. The situation is already complex enough at the EU level, 
so we will not address national disparities here. However, our subject is purposely at the intersection of 
cybersecurity, criminal justice, and fundamental rights. We cannot therefore isolate the ‘justice’ dimen-
sion from these other two dimensions of ‘security’ and ‘freedom’.217 
 
A3.1 State of the Art 
First of all, we need to outline the present legal situation regarding cybercrime in the EU. To this aim, 
we will consider in turn criminal law and its main areas, the rationale and mechanisms for its harmoni-
sation, the legislation in force at the European level, and its implementation by Member States. 
What is crime? Its nature is widely debated. What is considered as crime changes from place to place 
and evolves through time. The only thing that all criminal acts have in common is that they are prohib-
ited by the state.218 Criminal law determines what conduct constitutes an offence and what correspond-
ing penalty is applicable. 
There is no offence nor penalty without law.219 Criminal conduct must be clearly defined and delimited. 
As Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states: “No one shall be held guilty of 
any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under 
national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed 
than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.”220 
Criminal (or penal) law is a subdomain of the law. There are other legal means of enforcement such as 
civil or administrative sanctions. But the criminal law response is used as a last resort: only the most 
serious acts and omissions are criminalised, i.e. made into crimes. What then is the difference between 
criminal penalties and other types of sanctions? 
                                                          
* This section has been written by Florent Wenger (Université de Lausanne) and David-O. Jaquet-Chiffelle (Université de Lau-
sanne). 
215 Choraś and Kozik, CAMINO Roadmap, 7. 
216 This threefold plan is motivated by the CANVAS project proposal for this section of this deliverable. 
217 For instance, the police contribute to security efforts, but are also responsible for law enforcement. 
218 ‘CYBERROAD D-3.1’, 8. 
219 Klip, European Criminal Law, 196ff. 
220 Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms [1950] ETS No.005. 
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According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the legal classification of an offence under 
national law is not decisive. Following the so-called Engel criteria221, the ECtHR in Strasbourg has ruled 
that “the criminal nature of the penalty can be deduced from both the general character of the rule and 
the purpose of the penalty, which relate to deterrence and to its punitive nature.”222 Therefore, criminal 
sanctions are established as a punishment and meant to be dissuasive.223 
Criminal law is generally divided into substantive law and procedural law. The former encompasses the 
definition of offences and their penalties, while the latter sets the framework for criminal investigation 
and proceedings. In the fight against cybercrime (or any crime), both substantive and procedural law 
are important and interdependent. 
A3.1.1 Harmonisation 
Criminal law was historically a matter of national sovereignty. However, many areas of crime often have 
a cross-border dimension. Within Europe, “[d]ifferences in the criminal laws of the Member States are 
often referred to as providing criminals with an advantage, by allowing them to choose the Member 
State with the most lenient laws or simply by making the prosecution and investigation of crime more 
complicated.”224 This is especially true in cyberspace: offenders can benefit from legal loopholes and 
operate from digital havens because all countries are internetworked. 
This is why “criminal law, once considered the preserve of the nation state, has increasingly become 
subject to ‘outside’ involvement.”225 Regarding cybercrime, significant efforts have been made by the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU). CoE and EU mechanisms are different but they 
share the same goal: combating transnational crime by harmonising national laws and improving inter-
national cooperation in criminal matters. 
CoE treaties include conventions and their additional protocols. Although all 28 EU Member States are 
also members of the CoE, this does not imply that every EU Member State has signed and ratified (or 
later acceded to) any particular CoE instrument. Each treaty has its own chart of signatures and ratifica-
tions by member and non-member states, with their respective dates of entry into force. The states 
party to a CoE treaty commit to implementing its provisions in their national legal systems. 
At the EU level, the situation is more complex. The Union’s competence has radically changed since 
2009 with the Lisbon Treaty. According to treaties, EU institutions have the authority to legislate in 
limited areas, in which EU law overrides domestic laws. There are several types of EU legal acts, including 
regulations and directives which are binding for all Member States, although in a different way.226 Prior 
to the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, there was another kind of legislative act which was 
specific to criminal justice: the framework decision. Existing framework decisions continue to be appli-
cable until they are repealed but they are now being converted into directives.227 
According to Article 83(1) TFEU, the Union may “establish minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions in areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension 
resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a com-
mon basis. These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual 
                                                          
221 Cf. ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1978, Series A no. 22, paras. 80-82. 
222 Klip, European Criminal Law, 2.  
223 These and other functions of criminal penalties are debated, but this issue is outside the scope of this paper. 
224 Summers et al., The Emergence of EU Criminal Law, 276. 
225 Ibid., 5. 
226 “Regulations apply to all Member States, and automatically become part of the law of each Member State without the 
State having to incorporate the measure into its domestic law: they are thus ‘binding’ in their entirety and ‘directly applica-
ble’. (…) Directives differ from regulations in that … while they are binding as to the result to be achieved, they leave the 
Member States scope to determine the form and the method of their implementation in national law.” (Ibid., 21–22) 
227 Ibid., 46. 
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exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, cor-
ruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime [i.e. cybercrime] and organised crime.” 
These ten offences are the so-called ‘Euro crimes’.228 “Of the ten offences that are mentioned … only 
for ‘illicit arms trafficking’ has no criminal legislation been adopted [so far].”229 
Article 83(2) TFEU also allows the EU to “establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of crim-
inal offences and sanctions if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States 
proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been 
subject to a harmonisation measure”.230 Moreover, Article 325(4) TFEU enables EU institutions to “adopt 
the necessary measures in the fields of the prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial 
interests of the Union”. Together, these provisions define the scope for EU criminal law. 
A3.1.2 Legislation 
“Cybercrime law is a continuously evolving process.”231 Moreover, “European criminal law deals with a 
multi-layered patchwork of legislation and case law.”232 There is no such thing as an EU criminal code: 
the relevant dispositions are scattered across a series of legal acts. But what is (and what is not) cyber-
crime? “Despite the extensive legal framework on cybercrime, neither law nor academic research pro-
vide for a common definition or classification of cybercrime. The great variety of offences that are usu-
ally referred to as cybercrimes makes it difficult to define uniform criteria for differentiating cybercrimes 
from other criminal offences. Similarly, there is no commonly accepted classification or categorisation 
of cybercrime.”233 Here below is an inclusive overview of the current cybercrime legislation. For more 
details, the reader is referred to the E-CRIME234, EVIDENCE235 and FIDUCIA236 projects reports. 
As for CoE treaties, there are the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and its Protocol on Xenophobia 
and Racism237, the Lanzarote Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse238, the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters239 and the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms240 (with their additional protocols). 
Chronologically at the EU level241, the relevant acts enacted before the Lisbon Treaty reform (but still in 
force to date) include Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society242, Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA combating fraud and 
                                                          
228 Cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee and the Committee of the Regions – Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU poli-
cies through criminal law, Brussels 20.9.2011, COM/2011/0573 final. 
229 Klip, European Criminal Law, 231. 
230 These areas are: spam; intellectual property; unauthorised entry, transit and residence (illegal immigration); employment 
of illegal migrants; environmental crime, including ship-source pollution; racism and xenophobia; insider dealing and market 
manipulation. (Summers et al., The Emergence of EU Criminal Law, 70–76) 
231 Koops and Robinson, ‘Digital Evidence and Computer Crime’, 182. 
232 Klip, European Criminal Law, 1. 
233 ‘FIDUCIA D-9.2’, 93. 
234 ‘E-CRIME D-3.2’, 21–48. 
235 ‘EVIDENCE D-3.1’, 15–39. 
236 ‘FIDUCIA D-9.3’, 5–32. 
237 Convention on cybercrime [2001] ETS No.185. Additional protocol concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and 
xenophobic nature committed through computer systems [2003] ETS No.189. 
238 Convention on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse [2007] CETS No.201. 
239 European convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters [1959] ETS No.030. 
240 Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms [1950] ETS No.005 (better known as the Euro-
pean convention on human rights). 
241 We do not distinguish between substantive and procedural law because legal acts affect either one or both. 
242 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain as-
pects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167/10. 
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counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment243, Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA on joint investiga-
tion teams244, Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States245, Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communica-
tions246 and Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs247. 
The cybercrime-related acts passed under the Treaty of Lisbon are Directive 2011/93/EU on combating 
the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography248, Directive 2013/40/EU on 
attacks against information systems249, Directive 2014/41/EU regarding the European investigation or-
der in criminal matters250, the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679251, Directive (EU) 
2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by com-
petent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties252 and finally Directive (EU) 2016/1148 concerning 
measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union253. 
A3.1.3 Implementation 
All the above-mentioned EU legal acts are binding for (nearly254) all EU Member States. “However, like a 
Directive, a Regulation cannot of itself and independently of implementing national law, determine or 
aggravate criminal responsibility. (…) The same goes for obligations that result from a Framework Deci-
sion.”255 Indeed, “the principle of legality … requires that criminal liability finds its basis in national crim-
inal law. Direct applicability of Union law, without national transposition, is prohibited.”256 
Implementation by each state in its particular legal system is therefore necessary. As for EU directives, 
all Member States must take transposition measures and communicate them to the Commission. The 
latter issues reports assessing the implementation progress and comparing the resulting legislations 
                                                          
243 Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment 
(2001/413/JHA) [2001] OJ L149/1. 
244 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams (2002/465/JHA) [2002] OJ L162/1. 
245 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Mem-
ber States (2002/584/JHA) [2002] OJ L190/1. 
246 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communica-
tions) [2002] OJ L201/37. 
247 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer 
programs [2009] OJ L111/16. 
248 Directive 2011/93/EU (initially published with duplicate number 2011/92/EU) of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and re-
placing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA [2011] OJ L335/1. 
249 Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information 
systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA [2013] OJ L218/8. 
250 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation 
Order in criminal matters [2014] OJ L130/1. 
251 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural per-
sons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1. 
252 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural per-
sons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investiga-
tion, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ L119/89. 
253 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high 
common level of security of network and information systems across the Union [2016] OJ L194/1.  
254 There are three exceptions. “The UK and Ireland are entitled to decide not to take part in adoption of measures proposed 
pursuant to Title V [‘Area of freedom, security and justice’] of Part Three of the TFEU [Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union]. (…) Denmark is exempt from all policy and criminal law measures adopted after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon [i.e. 1 December 2009]. Unlike the UK and Ireland, it is not permitted to opt in to specific individual 
measures either at the time of adoption or a later date.” (Summers et al., The Emergence of EU Criminal Law, 54–56) 
255 Klip, European Criminal Law, 197–98. 
256 Ibid., 243. 
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throughout the EU.257 “The legislative practice … in implementation show a wide variety of techniques, 
even within one Member State. Union law leaves Member States free in the use of these techniques. It 
is the result that counts.”258 But all provisions must be completely implemented before deadline. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg ensures that the Member States comply 
with their obligations and that EU law is uniformly interpreted and applied.259 
At the CoE level, the Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) facilitates the implementation of the 
Budapest Convention, while the Cybercrime Programme Office (C-PROC) assists state parties in their 
capacity building. Also worth noting is the Octopus Cybercrime Community’s country wiki whose profiles 
provide a worldwide overview of national policies on cybercrime and electronic evidence.260  
Before concluding, we need to mention the authorities that enforce the law. “Enforcement takes place 
on multiple areas and levels, meaning that there is a large variety of authorities charged with the pre-
venting, deterring and investigating cybercrime instances. Starting at local level with local, central police 
forces, national special units going to European and international organisations. (…) These actors may 
be involved in Network and Information Security (NIS), law enforcement and defence in cyber incidents 
and attacks.”261 The table below shows the European stakeholders involved in cybercrime prevention, 
investigation, and enforcement. 
In conclusion, we want to stress the ever-changing, fragmented nature of the fight against cybercrime, 
not only in the ‘justice’ dimension, but also in the ‘security’ dimension: “1. The landscape is constantly 
changing, adapting to recent developments and needs. Meaning that not only the nature of the crimes 
and technologies change, but also policies, best practices and players in the field. Yesterday’s policies 
may no longer be up to date and responsibilities may have shifted to other authorities. 2. There is frag-
mentation as regards legislation and policies as well as regards actors involved … as cybercrime requires 
regulation on all levels. Cybercrime affects multiple areas of law and regulation, policies and enforce-
ment are necessary on all levels: local, regional, national as well as international action and regulation 
are required.”262 
Actors involved in cybercrime prevention, investigation, and enforcement263 
 In NIS264 In law enforcement265 In defence 
At national level - NIS competent authorities 
- CERTs266 
 
- Police forces 
- Cybercrime units 
- Defence and security 
agencies 
At the EU level - ENISA267 
- CERT266-EU 
- EP3R268 
- EC3 (Europol)269 
- CEPOL270 
- Eurojust271 
- EEAS272 
- EDA273 
                                                          
257 E.g. Report from the Commission to the European parliament and the Council assessing the extent to which the Member 
States have taken the necessary measures in order to comply with Directive 2011/93/EU, Brussels 16.12.2016, 
COM/2016/0871 final. All the measures taken are published online in EUR-Lex under the ‘National transposition’ tab. 
258 Klip, European Criminal Law, 243. 
259 Ibid., 133. 
260 Octopus Cybercrime Community: http://www.coe.int/en/web/octopus/countries  
261 ‘E-CRIME D-3.2’, 56. 
262 Ibid., 67. 
263 This figure is adapted from Ibid., 57. 
264 NIS: Network and Information Security. 
265 Here, ‘law enforcement’ is to be understood in a broad meaning that includes any entity who enforces the law. 
266 CERT: Computer Emergency Response Team (alias CSIRT: Computer Security Incident Response Team). 
267 ENISA: EU Agency for Network and Information Security. 
268 EP3R: European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience. 
269 EC3: European Cybercrime Centre at Europol (which is the EU’s law enforcement agency). 
270 CEPOL: EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (Collège européen de police). 
271 Eurojust: EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit. 
272 EEAS: European External Action Service, i.e. the EU’s diplomatic service. 
273 EDA: European Defence Agency. 
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A3.2 Challenges and Controversies 
Having seen what the current legal situation is regarding cybercrime in the EU, we will now focus on 
what it should and could be. We will try and give an overview of the main challenges and controversies. 
A3.2.1 Current and Future Challenges 
Two recent EU projects have made a significant contribution in identifying and addressing challenges in 
the cybercrime area.274 According to the CyberROAD ‘Social, economic, political and legal landscape re-
port’, “[i]nternational cooperation against cybercrime is difficult for four, partly related reasons: a) due 
to sovereignty protection of states, b) national security concerns, c) differences of the societal, cultural 
and legal background of countries and d) general weaknesses in implementation.”275 
Moreover, “[t]here is currently a range of emerging research issues related to the governance of cyber-
crime, mainly relating to a) the definition, focus and costs related to cybercrime, b) the reasons for con-
vergence and divergence in regulating and governing cybercrime, c) increasing exchange with non-state 
actors and d) the development of legal and other normative perspectives on cybercrime”:276 
a) Cybercrime still needs to be clearly defined and classified, ranging “from stalking to pornography, 
from malware to espionage, from loss of personal data to threats to critical infrastructure.”277 We 
also lack reliable statistics on cybercrime and its damage, including direct and indirect costs. 
b) International harmonisation would benefit from analysing the reasons for the convergence and di-
vergence of cybercrime regulation in various countries, in particular by identifying “which areas are 
more likely to converge than others.”278 
c) Non-state actors like companies and non-governmental organisations raise awareness regarding 
crime and implement cybercrime regulations. Future research could analyse how the public-private 
interaction can be facilitated and which problems of implementation are to be expected. 
d) As criminalisation “is only one way of including normative standards [see e.g. the IRPC Charter279] 
(…) more research on legitimate and illegitimate activity in cyberspace would be beneficiary [sic] to 
gain a normative framework on cyberactivism, cybercrime and e-democracy.”280 
From another perspective, the CAMINO ‘Comprehensive roadmap (research agenda) for fight against 
cybercrime and cyberterrorism’ sets out ten general objectives in the regulatory dimension: 281 
A. Investigatory powers in intra-jurisdictional and trans-border cases 
1) Reducing the gap between the average efficacy of investigations in ‘real-world’ enquiries and 
cyber-enquiries by adequate investigatory powers 
2) Finding an effective, fundamental rights-compliant framework for the future of data exchange 
between national and EU law enforcement authorities 
3) Improving the efficacy of investigatory powers beyond the EU borders (cybercrime and money 
laundering) 
B. Civil and criminal courts forensics, admissibility and evidential standards 
4) Homogeneity and European consensus of the admissible forensic analysis process for digital 
evidence 
5) Adaptation and updating the current legislation to the cyber and digital world 
                                                          
274 See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime’. On the specific issue of a Euro-
pean data exchange framework for electronic evidence, there is the EVIDENCE project, too. 
275 ‘CYBERROAD D-3.1’, 42. 
276 Ibid., 44. 
277 Ibid., 45. 
278 Ibid., 46. 
279 Internet Rights & Principles Coalition, ‘The Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet’. 
280 ‘CYBERROAD D-3.1’, 47. 
281 Cf. Choraś and Kozik, CAMINO Roadmap, 56–70. 
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6) Coordination of the future evolution of citizens' rights protection with the adoption of new ev-
idential standards 
7) Digital forensics training and certification schemes 
C. Electronic identity and trust services for data protection across borders 
8) Agreement on levels of authentication 
9) Alignment of public/private eIDAS282 levels within EU 
10) International management of interoperability. 
Finally, here is Prof. André Klip’s insight283 on the evolution of European criminal law in cyberspace: 
- “The changes brought about by new computer and telecommunication technologies to our society 
are enormous and, although they are ongoing, it is not an exaggeration to state that they have had 
and will continue to have dramatic consequences for all aspects of criminal law and criminal proce-
dure.”284 
- “Furthermore, new legal questions are appearing on the horizon with regard to investigations into 
crimes committed in the information society. (…) Cloud computing raises the question of where 
data are stored and which legislation applies. Wireless communication also poses new problems to 
law enforcement agencies because the transmission of data may involve various states or interna-
tional organisations.”285 
- “Even though it may be fully justified to state that cybercrime is a problem of a scale that is beyond 
the European Union only, this does not mean that no answer must be formulated to the question 
of what the European Union’s approach to cybercrime is.”286 
Nevertheless, all these legal challenges should not make us forget that cybercrime “cannot be viewed 
in one single dimension. Only an interdisciplinary and integrated approach to the phenomenon will en-
able its full comprehension and allow appropriate preventive and reactive measures to be taken; the 
effectiveness of these measures will depend on their completeness and consistency.”287 
A3.2.2 Controversies on EU Criminal Policy 
As we will see, the EU’s intervention in criminal law causes controversy. A comprehensive inventory of 
all controversies would be tedious, so we will limit ourselves to outlining the main issues raised. A de-
tailed discussion on criminalisation, harmonisation, and Europeanisation can already be found else-
where288, but these three keywords sum up the general debate. First, is criminal law required? Are crim-
inal sanctions really necessary and efficient to address the problems? Or is there “an over-reliance on 
the magic of the criminal law”?289 Second, why harmonise criminal law at the EU level? And how to do 
so in a coherent way while respecting the national identities of the Member States?290 In particular, is 
harmonisation possible without defining ‘general part’ principles?291 Third, will EU criminal law compe-
tence continue to grow in the future? How far will the legal integration process go despite resistance 
among Member States? 
                                                          
282 Concerning Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic iden-
tification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market [2014] OJ L257/73. 
283 He is Professor of criminal law, criminal procedure and transnational criminal law at Maastricht University.  
284 Klip, European Criminal Law, 538. 
285 Ibid., 539. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ghernaouti-Hélie, Cyber Power, 290. 
288 Summers et al., The Emergence of EU Criminal Law, 271–84. 
289 Ibid., 279. 
290 Cf. Art. 4 para. 2 TEU (Treaty on European Union): “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government.” 
291 Such as the notions of intention, participation (aiding and abetting, instigation, incitation), and attempt. 
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In 2009, a group of criminal law scholars issued their first manifesto on substantive law.292 They advocate 
a balanced and coherent EU criminal policy based on six fundamental principles: 1) the requirements of 
a legitimate purpose; 2) the ultima ratio (or last resort) principle; 3) the principle of guilt (mens rea or 
guilty mind); 4) the principle of legality and its three subprinciples293; 5) the principle of subsidiarity; 
6) the principle of coherence294. Using these principles as guidelines, they examine many EU legal acts 
before concluding: “[a]lthough the line to unbearable consequences has not been crossed some alarm-
ing tendencies must be observed and not be ignored: criminal law must not be adopted without pursu-
ing a legitimate purpose; the principle of ultima ratio must not be neglected; the Member States must 
not be obliged to pass imprecise national criminal laws; the legislation must not answer every social 
problem with passing increasingly repressive acts and consider this as a value in itself.”295 
In 2013, the same ‘European Criminal Policy Initiative’ published a second manifesto on procedure 
law.296 For these scholars, “the laws of criminal procedure and mutual legal assistance, which recently 
have increasingly been shaped by Union legislation, must adhere to the highest standards of the rule of 
law and must continuously guarantee fundamental rights, notwithstanding the fact that in this area of 
law various interests of states, societies and individuals have to be balanced.”297 They express six de-
mands to the EU legislator: 1) limitation of mutual recognition298, 2) balance of the European criminal 
proceeding299; 3) respect for the principle of legality and judicial principles in European criminal pro-
ceedings300; 4) preservation of coherence; 5) observance of the principle of subsidiarity301; 6) compen-
sation of deficits in the European criminal proceedings302. With respect to these demands, as shown 
with many examples from EU legislation, “considerable efforts still need to be taken in order to make 
the Union a genuine area of freedom, security and justice with regard to criminal prosecution.”303 
A3.2.3 Specific Controversies on Cybercrime 
As already noted, the definition and classification of cybercrime are still debated. In 2007, the EU Com-
mission defined ‘cyber crime’ (in two words) as “criminal acts committed using electronic communica-
tions networks and information systems [in short: electronic networks] or against such networks and 
systems” and identified three categories: 1) traditional forms of crime committed over electronic net-
works; 2) the publication of illegal content over electronic media; 3) crimes unique to electronic net-
works, i.e. attacks against information systems, denial of service and hacking.304  
These three categories correspond to those of the Convention on Cybercrime, namely “computer-integ-
rity crimes (where the computer is object of the offence), computer-assisted crimes (where the com-
                                                          
292 European Criminal Policy Initiative, ‘Manifesto I’. 
293 1) The lex certa requirement (legal certainty); 2) the requirements of non-retroactivity and the principle of lex mitior 
(milder law); 3) nulla poena sine lege parlamentaria (no penalty without a law). 
294 Coherence must be attained both horizontally, i.e. within the legal order of the Union, and vertically, i.e. in the Member 
States’ systems of criminal justice. 
295 European Criminal Policy Initiative, ‘Manifesto I’, 715. 
296 European Criminal Policy Initiative, ‘Manifesto II’. 
297 Ibid., 430. 
298 Through the rights of the individual (suspect, victim or third person), through the national identity and ordre public (public 
policy) of the Member States, and through the principle of proportionality. 
299 Warning against a possible shift in power solely in favour of the prosecution, they suggest creating supranational institu-
tions that strengthen the position of the affected individuals. 
300 There is a need for a clear set of rules governing which Member States may exercise criminal jurisdiction. 
301 EU action may only be taken on the condition that the goal pursued a) cannot be reached as effectively by measures taken 
at the national level, and b) due to its nature or scope can be better achieved at Union level. 
302 Safety mechanisms should include compensation measures to ensure that the first five demands are met. 
303 European Criminal Policy Initiative, ‘Manifesto II’, 446. 
304 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Committee of the Regions – To-
wards a general policy on the fight against cyber crime, Brussels 22.5.2007, COM/2007/267 final. 
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puter is an instrument), and content-related crimes (where the computer network constitutes the en-
vironment of the crime).”305 Globally, there are more controversies on the last two categories than on 
computer-integrity crimes (or ‘hard-core cybercrime’306). For brevity, we will now try and summarise the 
different views on criminalisation in four significant areas of cybercrime: spam and piracy (two com-
puter-assisted crimes), child pornography and terrorism (two content-related crimes).307 
First, ‘spam’ refers to unsolicited commercial email (UCE).308 Directive 2002/58/EC309 illustrates the “im-
portance of balancing the economic interests of businesses with the privacy interests of the con-
sumer.”310 Following the controversial ‘soft opt-in’ approach, direct email marketing is only allowed to 
subscribers who have given their prior consent, with the exception of existing customers concerning 
own similar products or services (Art. 13).311 But filtering techniques have proven more helpful against 
spam than the threat of criminal sanctions. “While tempting, there is little evidence to support this 
assertion that higher penalties or criminal law sanctions actually have a dissuasive effect upon 
spammers.”312 Moreover, “the majority of spam in EU countries, approximately 90 per cent, is sent from 
outside the EU. (…) As such, the EU regime is only applicable to a very small proportion of offenders. (…) 
Most accept that the recent decrease in spam is borne of the increasing success of technical, rather 
than legal, protection measures. Technical solutions have proved most effective in providing protection 
against spam. (…) Rather than disparate states across continents, they rely upon the self-regulation of 
a few major IT players and ISPs who mostly share the interest in combating spam.”313 
Then, ‘piracy’ refers to copyright violations.314 Copyright protection on the Internet is a huge challenge: 
how to enforce intellectual property rights (IPRs) when their infringements are so widespread? Whereas 
some would like to reduce or even abolish copyright, rights holders strive to strengthen copyright and 
enforce it by all means, including through the criminal law. “[D]ifficult questions arise as to the correct 
balance to be achieved between protecting the rights of the right holder, on the one hand, and protect-
ing other interests such as the internal market or individual rights, such as freedom of information, on 
the other. (…) In addition, … copyright protection in the digital age cannot be divorced from matters 
such as ‘Internet freedom’ not least because there is considerable potential for obligations to be placed 
on Internet subscribers or Internet service provider (ISPs) to ensure that Internet connections are not 
used to infringe intellectual property. (…) In short, as soon as the focus moves away from commercial 
activities and towards the practices of individuals, the criminalisation of copyright infringement be-
comes controversial.”315 
More generally, content regulation is a controversial subject.316 “The determination of what constitutes 
‘criminal’ as opposed to ‘lawful’ content depends to a large extent on the political and cultural context 
in which issues such as censorship, freedom of expression and more broadly the relationship between 
the individual and the government are determined.”317 EU policy distinguishes between harmful content 
                                                          
305 Koops and Robinson, ‘Digital Evidence and Computer Crime’, 129–30. In a way, the content of the Cybercrime Convention 
reflects the international consensus on cybercrime law (e.g. which offences are defined or omitted). 
306 Ibid., 130–32. 
307 These four areas of cybercrime are particularly relevant and instructive with respect to fundamental rights. 
308 Cf. Summers et al., The Emergence of EU Criminal Law, 199–230. 
309 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communica-
tions) [2002] OJ L201/37. 
310 Summers et al., The Emergence of EU Criminal Law, 218. 
311 What’s more, each message should give the opportunity to unsubscribe (as in the ‘opt-out’ approach). Note that regulat-
ing spam can be seen as limiting free speech and thus interfering with the freedom of expression. 
312 Summers et al., The Emergence of EU Criminal Law, 227. 
313 Ibid., 228–29. 
314 Cf. Ibid., 113–55. 
315 Ibid., 119. 
316 Cf. Ibid., 156–98. 
317 Ibid., 156. 
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and illegal content. “Illegal content is considered obviously and universally unlawful, whereas the deci-
sion about whether content is ‘harmful’ or not is considered to depend on ‘cultural differences’…”318 But 
even illegal content stirs controversy. “Some offences, notably those relating to child pornography, are 
widely accepted as necessary even though questions remain as to their scope, while others, such as 
some of the provisions on terrorist offences are the subject of considerable controversy both as regards 
their desirability in the first place and their extent.”319 
Directive 2011/93/EU defines a child as any person below the age of 18 years320, although young people 
under 18 already have sexual consent in all EU countries except Malta. Child pornography includes “not 
only pornographic material involving actual children, but also pornographic material involving adults 
who look like children (youthful adult pornography) and computer-generated pornographic material 
involving children, although not created using any actual children (virtual-child pornography).”321 Some 
argue that “these broad provisions, which seem to test the boundaries of the criminal law, will never-
theless prove difficult to reconcile with constitutionally protected notions of free speech and the pre-
sumption of innocence. (…) ‘The emphasis shifted from protecting children from harm to attacking pos-
session itself.’”322 Others question the legal certainty of youthful-adult pornography. “Whether or not a 
person of age appears as a minor cannot be described legally. (…) This criterion will not lead to foresee-
able results and is not suitable for the use in criminal law provisions.”323 
Finally, as for terrorism, “[t]he Internet is referred to as having the potential to ‘inspire and mobilise 
local terrorist networks and individuals’ and as a source of ‘information on terrorist means and methods’ 
such as amount to a ‘virtual training camp’.”324 Directive (EU) 2017/541325 includes the ‘public provoca-
tion to commit a terrorist offence’ among offences related to terrorist activities (Art. 5). This offence 
“has been subject to considerable criticism both because of its wide scope and because of uncertainty 
about the commitment to fundamental human rights guarantees, notably freedom of expression. The 
definition of ‘terrorist offence’ is undeniably broad and this breadth is expanded further by the defini-
tion of provocation which does not require that the speech actually results in a terrorist act, only that 
the speech ‘causes a danger’ that an offence may be committed.”326 However, in this area “the focus of 
the EU has been very much on holding individual users liable rather than on imposing liability on service 
or host providers. This is partly a consequence of worries about allowing governments to censor the 
Internet and partly due to the practical and financial burdens that would accompany demands that pro-
viders monitor all content before it is posted.”327 
 
A3.3 Integration of EU values 
In this final section, we will consider the values at stake in criminal justice. If all of cybersecurity should 
be value-driven, what does it imply in the fight against cybercrime? Since our approach here is a legal 
one rather than an ethical or empirical one, we will focus on the values enshrined in the law. 
 
 
                                                          
318 Ibid., 162. 
319 Ibid., 168. Again, regulation in these areas can be viewed negatively as limiting the freedom of speech. 
320 In accordance with the Lanzarote Convention (see § 3.1.3 above).  
321 Summers et al., The Emergence of EU Criminal Law, 179. 
322 Ibid., 181. 
323 European Criminal Policy Initiative, ‘Manifesto I’, 713. 
324 Summers et al., The Emergence of EU Criminal Law, 168. 
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A3.3.1 The Legal Values Behind Offences and Penalties 
Criminal offences exist to protect our legal values, by aiming to deter and punish attacks against these 
very values. Furthermore, criminal sanctions reveal what we value most: the more severe the sanction 
for an offence is, the more important the corresponding value (normally) is. For example, if the penalty 
for homicide is more severe than for theft, it is because human life is deemed more valuable than private 
property.328 Indeed, theft is less serious than homicide329 due to different underlying values.  
Looking back, we see that criminal offences and associated penalties change over time, depending on 
(among others) the evolution of mores in our societies: new offences appear whereas others disappear 
and the definition of criminal conduct can be either expanded or narrowed.330 Likewise, criminal law 
varies in space: while many offences exist in all Member States due to common European values, some 
offences are specific to certain countries or have more or less severe penalties across the EU.331 
Criminal sanctions evolve, too: not only the penalties corresponding to specific offences, but also the 
range of sanctions itself. All CoE members (except Russia) have ratified ECHR Protocol No. 6 abolishing 
the death penalty.332 “No-one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed” (Art. 1), at least not in 
time of peace (Art. 2). Without capital punishment, criminal sanctions now include imprisonment, fines 
and community service.333 If criminal offences are defined to protect legal values, associated penalties 
can be seen as affecting some of the same values. Nowadays in the EU, criminal sanctions can harm a 
convicted person’s freedom or private property, but not his/her life or physical integrity. Why is it so 
and not the other way around? Again, this legal situation reveals much about our underlying values. 
All the crimes under EU law can be categorised according to the various legal values that they protect, 
namely fair competition, the integrity of the financial sector, the financial interest of the Union, human 
dignity, the democratic society, the integrity of public administration, public health, the fair administra-
tion of justice, the environment and, last but not least, the information society.334 This does not mean 
that these EU crimes are more important than, for example, murder or rape. They simply cover the area 
of competence that Member States have delegated to the Union under the Lisbon Treaty.335 
Ultimately, regardless of offences, criminalisation in itself is related to our democratic values. “There 
can be little doubt that the EU’s involvement in the criminal law has a considerable symbolic dimension. 
By marking out various types of conduct as violating EU law, it is [sic] can be seen to be ‘expressing and 
defining its own political identity’ thereby building the ‘supranational demos336 which it is repeatedly 
said to lack and which is seen by many as a prerequisite to genuine legitimacy’.”337 
A3.3.2 European criminal justice and fundamental rights 
Cybercrime poses a serious threat to the rule of law. If what holds offline should also hold online, then 
the law should be enforced in cyberspace. As for criminal justice, this implies that there should be no 
impunity in the cyber world. Offences should be reported and investigated, offenders identified and 
                                                          
328 Of course, the severity of the sanction also depends on other factors such as intention (e.g. is the offence deliberate or 
accidental?) and responsibility (e.g. to what extent is the author mature and sane?). 
329 At least from a legal point of view in our Western societies nowadays. 
330 For instance, in the Swiss Criminal Code, the offence of ‘adultery’ (Art. 214) has been revoked in 1990 while ‘incest’ (Art. 
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prosecuted. Besides, citizens should trust the justice system and not take the law into their own hands. 
Victims should not seek to avenge themselves by fighting back against attackers in cyberspace. 
Our goal here is not to discuss how and why reality departs from this ideal, but to look into the values 
at stake and their dynamics. Once again, we will concentrate on the values enshrined in European law. 
Apart from national constitutional provisions, the two main sources of fundamental rights are the 
ECHR338 and the EU Charter339. The ECHR dates back to 1950 and has been ratified by all 47 CoE mem-
bers, and therefore all 28 EU Member States. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 6), the EU itself 
shall accede to this Convention and obey its obligations.340 
In 2009, the EU Charter became legally binding on the EU institutions and on national governments. 
Being now part of the EU Treaties, the Charter belongs to primary law and prevails over all other sources 
of EU (and national341) law. Every act of secondary law, e.g. a regulation or a directive, must comply with 
the EU Charter. However, the Charter complements but does not replace national constitutions or the 
ECHR. Indeed, the EU Charter applies only when a fundamental rights issue involves the implementation 
of EU legislation by EU institutions or by national authorities. 
Regarding criminal justice, the EU Charter contains the following fundamental rights: under Title II ‘Free-
doms’, the right to liberty and security (Art. 6), the respect for private and family life (Art. 7), the pro-
tection of personal data (Art. 8), the freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 10), the freedom 
of expression and information (Art. 11), the freedom of assembly and of association (Art. 12), the right 
to property including intellectual property (Art. 17), the right to asylum for refugees (art. 18), and pro-
tection in the event of a removal, expulsion or extradition (Art. 19). Under Title VI ‘Justice’, the Charter 
includes the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Art. 47), the presumption of innocence and 
the right of defence (Art. 48), the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and pen-
alties (Art. 49), and the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same 
criminal offence (Art. 50). 
It is important to note that the EU Charter is consistent with the ECHR: when the Charter contains rights 
that come from the Convention, their meaning and scope are the same. Most of the above-mentioned 
fundamental rights have their counterpart in the ECHR or in one of its Protocols, which means that the 
case law of the ECtHR is decisive for their interpretation and application. In case of violation, legal action 
may be taken in national courts, in the CJEU, and ultimately in the ECtHR. 
As a result, fundamental rights are well defined and doubly protected in the EU. Legal mechanisms are 
in place to ensure that all laws and all authorities respect these rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, the 
far-reaching practical implications of general principles may not be self-evident, even with the guidance 
of the ECtHR and the CJEU. Moreover, there can be exceptions and limitations to fundamental rights if 
they are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, for various reasons such as the inter-
ests of national security or public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health 
or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Indeed, “[s]ociety has to deal with a major contradiction that exists between the needs of justice and 
police investigations and the rights to the protection of privacy and freedom for individuals, corpora-
tions, government [sic], and countries.”342 Exceptions to fundamental rights seem inevitable, especially 
in the fight against cybercrime. For instance, solving a case often requires analysing the communica-
tions343 of the persons involved, which interferes with the respect for private and family life as well as 
the protection of personal data. If all communications were recorded and stored indefinitely, these rec-
ords could be useful for some investigations, but there would be serious infringements to privacy. On 
                                                          
338 Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms [1950] ETS No.005. 
339 Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391. 
340 EU accession is currently under way. The EU should become the 48th party to the ECHR (without its Protocols). 
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342 Ghernaouti-Hélie, Cyber Power, 289. 
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the other hand, if absolutely no communication could be traced or monitored, many inquiries would be 
affected. 
In 2006, the EU adopted the Data Retention Directive344 concerning the retention of traffic and location 
data for the purpose of investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime (Art. 1). This Directive 
did not apply to content data, i.e. the communications themselves, but only to metadata, i.e. infor-
mation about their source, destination, date, time and location (Art. 5). EU communications providers 
were required to store such metadata for periods of not less than six months and not more than two 
years (Art. 6). Thus, specific metadata could only be accessed if a competent authority requested them 
in time.345 But unless service providers received a wiretapping order, they were not allowed to retain 
content data, which therefore could not be investigated retroactively.346 
The Data Retention Directive illustrates the trade-off between crime investigation needs and privacy 
protection. This Directive seemed balanced but, in 2014, it was declared invalid for violating the EU 
Charter. For the CJEU, it “entails an interference with the fundamental rights of practically the entire 
European population because it concerns all persons and all means of electronic communication. (…) 
[Therefore,] the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of 
proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8, and 52(1) of the Charter.”347 According to this important case 
law, although fighting serious crime is of the utmost importance to ensure public security, it does not, 
in itself, justify a data retention measure such as that established by this Directive.348 
Nowadays, the fight against cybercrime cannot be separated from national security. “With security ex-
panding far beyond the criminal domain, security strategies began searching for any sort of suspicious 
behavior or information that could potentially constitute a threat. The monitoring and surveillance of 
people’s movements, actions, communications, and transactions, thus, have become crucial compo-
nents of security responses within the EU and across the globe.”349 Blanket surveillance, e.g. through 
deep packet inspection (DPI), raises a similar fundamental rights issue than the Data Retention Directive. 
There is a significant difference between the restricted monitoring of some suspects with a suitable 
court warrant, and the indiscriminate surveillance of all citizens without specific reasons. Under which 
conditions does national security legitimate a limitation of fundamental rights? 
In the face of global terrorism, our values are being put to the test. What if something could provide the 
necessary information to prevent a terrorist attack and save many innocent lives? It could be just gaining 
illegal access to a remote computer, or monitoring everyone’s communications, or even torturing a 
suspect. A promising approach is to go beyond the supposed trade-off between security and privacy 
with a new “systemic approach to security [that] enables and promotes the simultaneous preservation 
of human security assets and fundamental civil and political rights.”350 
A3.3.3 Human rights in the area of freedom, security and justice 
From another perspective, Klip notes the emergence of a European criminal justice system in the area 
of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). “The merger of the two areas of the internal market and the 
[AFSJ], as provided by the Treaty of Lisbon, will bring important changes to criminal justice. (...) The 
gradual establishment of Union bodies and offices in the field of criminal justice demonstrates that a 
                                                          
344 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated 
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European criminal justice system is emerging. This can be seen from the establishment of Europol, Eu-
rojust, the European Judicial Network, and the EPPO [European Public Prosecutor's Office]. (…) Looking 
at integration as a linear process, it might be expected that, one day, the [EU] will establish a European 
criminal court and that European prison facilities will have to be constructed.”351 
According to Klip, this evolution has a significant impact on fundamental rights. “If the Court continues 
to execute its authority in a similar way, a further retreat of national criminal law autonomy and a cor-
respondingly greater degree of influence by Union law can be expected. (…) The Court's challenge for 
the coming years continues to be to establish the ‘rights’ components for the [AFSJ]. The time has come 
for European criminal law to demonstrate its utility for the accused and the victim.”352 
“In 1950, the [ECHR] was drafted in a context in which, as a rule, all facts relevant to the proceedings of 
citizens more or less took place within the boundaries of one specific state. This was also the case for 
human rights violations. In essence, when human rights violations occurred, there was only one state 
responsible and accountable for it. 
However, the situation in modern European society of 2016 is completely different. Nowadays people 
travel continuously from one state to another and borders hardly play a role anymore in the life of many 
Europeans. Human conduct in the virtual world is difficult to localise. Likewise, Member States have 
developed intensive co-operation in criminal matters, in order to combat crime. For certain border ar-
eas, the majority of criminal proceedings do have a foreign element for which co-operation is necessary.  
Of course, in these circumstances, human right violations may occur. States also co-operate in the com-
mission of violations of the ECHR and the Charter. It is here that the intensive co-operation of 2016 does 
not match the division of accountability and responsibility contemplated in 1950. In many situations, 
the applicant will not be able to tell which state committed a violation, because it took place at a very 
early stage of the proceedings, when he did not even know that he was a suspect (for example, Germany 
gave information to France and violated [ECHR] Article 8, because there was no legal basis to obtain 
it).”353 
As a conclusion, “[a] new perspective on human rights is necessary. Human rights must be ensured for 
individuals, regardless of whether it is a single Member State, two or more Member States, or even the 
European Union itself, that violates human rights. Human rights must not be ensured within the juris-
diction of a single Member State, but within the [AFSJ] as a whole. (…) On the basis of the Charter, the 
[CJEU] is quite clearly in a position to become the primary guarantor of human rights within the Union. 
What is necessary here is for the ‘area dimension’ of individual rights to be recognised.”354  
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Annex 4: Cybersecurity, Privacy and Data 
Protection 
This annex addresses cybersecurity from the perspective of the European data protection framework. 
Thereby, the current legislation on European level as well as the future framework on the basis of the 
European data protection reform are taken into account. 
 
A4.1 The European Data Protection Framework Addressing  
 Cybersecurity 
To understand the relation between data protection, privacy and cybersecurity, it is important to rec-
ognize the core requirements to protect personal information of individuals, as manifested in the cur-
rent as well as in the upcoming legal framework.  
The European Union initially regulated the processing of personal data in 1995, with the adoption of 
Directive 95/46/EC355. This directive has set the minimum standards for the protection of personal data 
for the EU member countries, which were obliged to transfer these into their national data protection 
law. However, it is not applicable for processing operations concerning public security, defence, state 
security, and the activities of a state in areas of criminal law. Therefore, personal data processing in the 
areas of police and justice is not covered by the provisions of the Directive, which has led to the emer-
gence of a regulatory patchwork for various application scopes, such as the Council Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA356, the 2008 Prüm Decision357, Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA358, or the 
Council Decision 2009/371/JHA359. In sum, at the moment the European Union lacks a comprehensive 
data protection framework which effectively covers all areas in which the protection of individual’s per-
sonal information is needed. 
Nonetheless, the current framework builds upon the historic foundation of Article 8 European Conven-
tion of Human Rights (ECHR), which recognises every individual’s right to privacy as fundamental right. 
Therein, the European data protection law assumes personal information of individuals as in need of 
specific protection, which also involves the protection from cybersecurity risks. 
                                                          
* This section has been written by Eva Schlehahn (Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein). 
355 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
356 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence 
between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union. 
357 The so-called Prüm decision (or Schengen III agreement) is an international agreement of 27 May 2005 which was initially 
concluded between Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain in Prüm in Germany. Its pur-
pose is the regulation of cross-border cooperation and information exchange to prevent and investigate crime. While the 
agreement is open to all members of the European Union, only 14 have signed the agreement so far. On February 15th 2007, 
the justice and interior ministers of the EU member states agreed upon the integration of the Prüm provisions into EU law.  
Some core elements of the decision are integrated in the EU Council Decision 2008/615/JHA on 23 June 2008 on the stepping 
up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime. 
358 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the frame-
work of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
359 Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (EUROPOL). This convention also 
contains specific provisions for the processing of information by EUROPOL of information and intelligence, including personal 
data (Chapter II ‘Information processing system’). 
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Directive 95/46/EC acknowledges core principles like the lawfulness of processing activities, fairness, 
transparency, purpose limitation and necessity, as well as the individual's rights e.g. of access and rec-
tification. But specifically relevant in the context of cybersecurity are the responsibilities of the data 
controllers, namely those entities determining the purposes and means of the processing. These re-
sponsibilities include the legal obligation to effectively implement technical and organisational 
measures to protect the personal information they intend to collect and process.  
Article 17 of Directive 95/46/EC (Security of processing) states that ‘[…] the controller must implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or un-
lawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where 
the processing involves the transmission of data over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of 
processing.’ Furthermore, this article obliges to controller to carefully choose data processors acting on 
his behalf as well as being able to demonstrate compliance. All of these obligations aim at a level of 
security which corresponds to risks the personal information may be exposed to, taking into account 
the type processing and the nature of the data to be protected. The individually needed technical and 
organisational measures may vary depending on case, situation and state of the art in specific areas. 
Thereby, they can entail preventive as well as reactive security measures such as for example, access 
control, encryption, data separation, records of processing activities, technical and organisational pro-
cedures for backup and restore, or data breach notification procedures, while this list is not conclusive. 
Typical standards already known in classical IT security such as ISE/IEC 27001 can also be taken into 
account too. 
In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon brought two substantial changes for the regulation of personal data pro-
cessing activities by the European Union. First, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights360 became binding 
to Member States, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) obtained competence to en-
force it. This EU Charter not only recognises a right to privacy (Article 7361) but also a right to data pro-
tection (Article 8362). Furthermore, Article 16 (1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) mandated the European Parliament and the Council to lay down for the protection of persona 
data in the areas of freedom, justice and security. So for the very first time, the Treaty of Lisbon facili-
tated an EU mandate for the adoption of a much more comprehensive instrument to regulate personal 
data processing activities for the civil sectors, as well as for the police and justice sectors. On the basis 
of this new mandate, the European Commission initiated a legislative process in January 2012 with the 
intention of harmonising the fragmented legal data protection framework across the European Un-
ion.363 This data protection reform produced two instruments coming into force on April 27th 2016, 
namely the: 
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regula-
tion)364  
- Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent au-
thorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
                                                          
360 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p. 1–22. 
361 Article 7 reads as follows: Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications. 
362 Article 8 para. 1 reads as follows: ‘Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
363 Cf. COM (2012) 9 final, titled ‘Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World - A European Data Protection Framework for the 
21st Century’. 
364 The General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 is the main framework directly applicable in the EU member states. 
It is in the following abbreviated as GDPR. 
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offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA365  
Both the GDPR, as well as Directive (EU) 2016/680 are meant to apply by May 25th 2018. Furthermore, 
a new regulation for electronic communications is underway in the legislative process, the so-called 
ePrivacy regulation. It will replace the current ePrivacy Directive366 with a possibly expanded scope in-
cluding Over-The-Top providers in addition to traditional telecom operators. However, despite being a 
completely new legal framework, the above-mentioned core principles of the current Directive 
95/46/EC remain. This includes the obligation of the controller(s) and processors to implement the ap-
propriate technical and organisational measures to protection the personal information they intend to 
collect and process.367  
Especially noteworthy are Article 32 GDPR and corresponding, Article 29 in Directive (EU) 2016/680 
which manifest specified requirements to ensure the security of processing. Both articles require the 
controller to conduct a risk assessment. Yet, it is very important to note that while the risks assessment 
as known classical in IT security, the data protection perspective is very different. IT security depart-
ments e.g. of companies are used to assess risks based on which financial or reputation damage for the 
company could be expected. In a proper data protection based risk assessment though, the perspective 
of the concerned data subject is paramount. A number of aspects play a role, such as the nature, scope, 
context and purpose of the processing, the inherent risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights 
and freedoms of the concerned data subjects, as well as the state of the art and implementation costs 
of the needed measures. In cases where the processing is deemed to result in a high risk to the rights 
and freedoms of natural persons, an additional data protection impact assessment must be con-
ducted.368  
Based on these assessments, the controller is required to determine the concrete technical and organ-
isational measures needed to sufficiently protect the personal data. According to Art. 32 (2) (b) GDPR, 
those measures are required to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience  More 
specific examples of technical and organisational measures are also made in both legal frameworks in 
various places, such as pseudonymization, encryption, the documentation of processing operations, ac-
cess control, and logging.369 Such measures can also be part of a data protection by design and by default 
approach as also demanded by the respectively applicable legal frameworks.370  
In contrast to the currently applicable Directive 95/46/EC, non-compliance is more likely to lead to neg-
ative consequences for the controller, since the competent data protection supervisory authorities are 
granted increased enforcement powers by the new legal framework, including higher number frames 
for fines. Even though differences regarding the required timeframes until implementation are to be 
expected, it might be advisable for each data controller to establish organisational test and release pro-
cedures and policies for data handling as well as risk and data protection impact assessments as early 
as possible. This assumption is supported by the requirement of repeated review and – if necessary – 
update of measures stated e.g. in Article 24 (1) sentence 2 GDPR. This means that in cases where the 
circumstances of the processing change in some way, the original presumption of meeting the state of 
the art cannot serve as an argument anymore. So when considering fines, it must be assumed that the 
                                                          
365 In contrast to the GDPR, the regulatory instrument for the police and justice sectors comes in form of a directive which 
needs to be transferred into correlating national law by the European countries. It is in the following abbreviated as Directive 
(EU) 2016/680. 
366 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic  communica-
tions). 
367 See Articles 24 (1) and 28 (1) GDPR or Articles 19 (1) and 22 (1) Directive (EU) 2016/680. 
368 Article 35 GDPR and Article 27 Directive (EU) 2016/680. 
369 See for those examples in the GDPR: Articles 6 (4) e (Lawfulness of processing), 30 (Records of processing activities), while 
the Directive (EU) 2016/680 has in parts even more technically specific requirements e.g. for logging, access control and other 
security measures, cf. Articles 25 (Logging) and 29 (Security of processing). 
370 See the Articles 25 GDPR and 20 Directive (EU) 2016/680. 
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respectively competent data protection supervisory authorities will take into account the effort and 
cooperation willingness of the controller, as well as how many of the required measures are imple-
mented.371 Consequently, making use of yearly security checks, audits, and best practices in technology, 
such as penetration tests and performance indicators seem to be reasonable to demonstrate compli-
ance. 
Beyond the preventive and reactive technical and organisational measure to protect the data, control-
lers and processors are required to make data breach notifications under certain circumstances and 
within specific timeframes. According to Article 4 (12) GDPR, ‘personal data breach’ means a breach of 
security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or 
access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed’. Therefore, the GDPR directly refers 
to security incidents with negative effect on the protection of personal data which may also play a role 
within the cybersecurity domain.  
According to Article 33 GDPR, a notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority is 
required no later than within 72 hours, unless a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons is 
unlikely. But according to Article 34 GDPR, if there is a high risk, the notification must also be made 
directly to the data subject without undue delay, unless specific technical and organisational measures 
are in place to render the personal data unintelligible to any person who is not authorised to access it, 
such as encryption. Moreover, a notification may be omitted if the controller has taken subsequent 
measures to ward off this high risk, or if the notification would involve disproportionate effort. However, 
in the latter case, a public communication or similar measure may be required of the controller none-
theless. 
Besides all of these above-mentioned requirements of GDPR and Directive (EU) 2016/680, a close ob-
servation of the still active legislative process for the future ePrivacy Regulation seems advisable. Since 
the future ePrivacy Regulation, meant to also be in force and applicable by May 2018, will be the up-
coming special law for the area of electronic communications, it plays also a significant role in cyberse-
curity matters too. This proposed regulation will most likely still undergo changes as the draft372 being 
current at the time of writing this document has been criticised significantly by relevant stakeholders in 
the data protection domain, such as the Article 29 Working Party373 and the European Data Protection 
Supervisor. What might matter most in the context of cybersecurity and more general IT security issues, 
the current draft has been found faulty for vagueness in the scope definition, as well as for weakened 
requirements in relation to information about security risks and data breaches, as well as regarding 
privacy by design and by default in comparison to the GDPR and thus provides lack of consistency.374 
 
A4.2 Current and Future Challenges from Data Protection  
 Perspective 
Worldwide, cybersecurity issues emerge or intensify with the further progression into the digital era. 
The growing use of information and communication technologies correlates with an increasing depend-
ence on hard- and software which can be vulnerable to threats of the most different kind. This affects 
                                                          
371 See Article 83 (2) (c) + (d) GDPR, directly referring to the requirements mentioned in Articles 25 and 32 GDPR.  
372 The ‘Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications’ as made by the European Commission in early 
2017 is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/proposal-regulation-privacy-and-electronic-commu-
nications 
373 The Article 29 Working Party was set up on account of Article 29 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which demands 
the formation of a working group on the Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. It functions 
as an independent advisory group counselling the European Commission in respect to data protection and privacy issues. 
374 See the Article 29 Working Party: ‘Opinion 01/2017 on the Proposed Regulation for the ePrivacy Regulation (2002/58/EC)’, 
adopted on 4 April 2017, WP247, pages 3 and 24. Furthermore, see the ‘Opinion 6/2017 EDPS Opinion on the Proposal for a 
Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications (ePrivacy Regulation)’, April 24th 2017, pages 3, 12 ff., 19, 22 f., and 34 f. 
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civilian as well as governmental areas alike, making appropriate responses crucial to succeed in provid-
ing the availability, integrity and confidentiality of those technologies.375 This includes also the personal 
data of individuals which is being collected and processed by digital technologies, and which may be 
exposed to cybersecurity risks.  
Cybersecurity incidents can cover a wide spectrum, ranging from e. g. hacking, blackmail encryption, 
data or identity theft. They can be caused by the most diverse entities for a number of different reasons, 
and with varying, often unforeseeable impact. With regard to cybersecurity challenges in general, the 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) developed a taxonomy classifying 
different threat types and individual threats at various level of detail. The purpose of this taxonomy is 
to establish a point of reference in a living structure.376 According to this document, a number of high 
level threat types have been identified, such as physical attacks, unintentional damage/loss of infor-
mation or IT assets, disaster (natural, environmental), failures/malfunction, outages, eavesdropping/in-
terception/hijacking, nefarious activity/abuse, and legal. A lot of these threats are closely linked to the 
cyber domain, for example hacking, IoT, botnets, ransomware, or doxxware.377  
While private actors may conduct cyberattacks for monetary or social motives, governmental activities 
usually extend to wider dimensions, which include Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) cyberspace activities 
for purposes of crime investigation or prevention, as well as further intelligence activities focused on 
national security. The targeted entities can also be varied, whereas the attack of critical infrastructure 
is to be considered as the most concerning for all countries worldwide, closely followed by attacks on 
the governmental structures themselves, e.g. by various types of election fraud. 
When focusing on governments specifically as potential cybersecurity attackers, the use of so-called 
surveillance-oriented security technologies (SOSTs) plays a significant role. Many states, also within the 
EU, allow to varying degrees and with different preconditions the deployment of such technologies378, 
which is often criticised by the media and human rights activists.379 Media reports about technology 
used by governments to infiltrate citizen’s devices brought into discussion their inherent risks of misuse 
and bias, usually coming along with a severe lack of transparency.  
An example is the governmental deployment of software infiltrating citizen’s devices to gain access to 
communications and files. In Germany, a Trojan Horse malware (named ‘Bundestrojaner’, translated: 
‘Federal Trojan’ or ‘State Trojan’) was discovered by the German Chaos Computer Club (CCC) in 2011 
which employed surveillance functionalities on targeted devices. The software was enabled for back-
door remote control and was proved generally weakening the security of the targeted device. The rev-
elation of the use of this malware triggered a significant public debate around the legality of such tech-
nologies in democratic societies.380   
Another example is the use of so-called zero-day exploit acquisition by governmental institutions to gain 
leverage in the field of domestic as well as foreign intelligence. Such approaches have received critical 
attention due to making the whole It landscape more insecure, while leaving security loopholes open 
                                                          
375 This was explicitly acknowledged by the European Union in its ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union - An Open, Safe 
and Secure Cyberspace’, JOIN (2013) 1 final, note 4, Brussels February 7th 2013, page 3.  
376 Initial version 1.0: ‘ENISA Threat Taxonomy - A tool for structuring threat information’, January 2016. 
377 Ibidem, cf. pages 8 ff. 
378 See for example, Pietrosanti, F. and Aterno, S., ‘Italy unveils a legal proposal to regulate government hacking’, published 
February 15th 2017 under: https://boingboing.net/2017/02/15/title-italy-unveils-a-law-pro.html.  
379 Cf. the report ‘Dangerously disproportionate: The ever-expanding national security state in Europe’, published by the organ-
isation Amnesty International on January 17th 2017. The report heavily criticises the digital surveillance of European govern-
ments as negatively affecting the cybersecurity of citizens’ devices. 
380 German CCC publication: ‘Chaos Computer Club analyzes government malware’, published October 8th 2011.  
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for the obtainment and potential exploitation not only by agencies with lawful national security inter-
ests, but also by malicious outsiders.381 
Another case with similar predicament is the debate around so-called ‘lawful access’ of police as well as 
intelligence agencies. Many of such institutions have long been demanding access to encrypted devices 
via backdoor functionalities. Thereby, legal obligations imposed on companies to implement such might 
in future affect all thinkable types of software and even hardware. Furthermore, the impact of weak-
ened encryption permeates all deployment sectors, including the financial sector due to the increasing 
use of cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin. Similar as with zero-day exploits, there is some risk of proliferation 
beyond the LEA sphere. Furthermore, the legal and factual preconditions for the access to encrypted 
information are not always clear, requiring clarification. Among security experts, there seems to be a 
growing recognition of the need to establish mandatory warrants and additional safeguards against mis-
use.382 But even beyond the mere scientific area, encryption has been acknowledged as presenting a 
number of different challenges for the criminal justice sector. In November 2016, the Council of the 
European Union383 proposed the launch of a reflection process on such challenges, led by the European 
Commission.384 Encryption was then further addressed in the Council Meeting on 8th and 9th December 
2016, at which the Ministers acknowledged that this is an area to be approached carefully to take into 
account the risks to privacy and cybersecurity.385 Furthermore, the ENISA published an opinion paper 
on encryption in December 2016, coming to the conclusion that weakening encryption to enable lawful 
interception is not an optimal approach. The ENISA explicitly warned of unintended consequences, e.g. 
weakening digital signatures and recommended some further benefits and risks analysis, as well as a 
more in-depth exploration of alternatives before any legislative actions should be taken.386 Similarly, the 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE)387 published an opinion already in 
2014 on security and surveillance technologies, highlighting the dangers of such technologies. It pointed 
out that while foreign state actors may pose a problem, it should not be forgotten that the deployment 
of intrusive surveillance technologies domestically is risky as well. Therefore, European and democratic 
principles and values must be taken into account carefully.388  
Therefore, specifically in the national security context, it ultimately comes back to the question of 
boundaries and which goals domestic surveillance should be allowed to pursue, taking into account the 
                                                          
381 A recent example is the theft of some the US National Security Agency’s most powerful espionage tools by the Shadow 
Brokers group. These were hoarded by the NSA’s TAO (Tailored Access Operations) department, yet outsiders from the men-
tioned hacking group published them in August 2016, causing significant media reaction. See e.g. Nakashima, E. for The Wash-
ington Post Online: ‘Powerful NSA hacking tools have been revealed online’, August 16th 2016. 
382 Bellovin, S., M.; Blaze, M.; Clark, S.; Landau, S.: ‘Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Inter-
net’, 12 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1 (2014). 
383 The Council of the European Union is an official EU body, whose members are the ministers from each EU country, on the 
basis of the respective policy areas which are addressed. It should not be confused with the European Council, which is another 
EU body consisting of the 28 EU member state government leaders, the European Council President and the President of the 
European Commission. The European Council defines the EU’s strategic short- and long-term policy agenda. For the sake of 
completeness, there is another entity named the Council of Europe (CoE). Yet, this is not an official EU body, but a human rights 
organisation which was established in 1949 after World War II. It now comprises of 47 member states, 28 of which belong to 
the European Union. All CoE member states have signed up to the European convention on Human Rights, and the ministers 
of foreign affairs of each member state is involved in the committee of ministers as the decision-making body of the CoE.  
384 Cf. Note 14711/16 from the Council of the European Union Presidency to the Permanent Representatives Committee/Coun-
cil on the subject title ‘Encryption: Challenges for criminal justice in relation to the use of encryption - future steps - progress 
report’, Brussels November 23rd 2016, page 7. 
385 Outcome of the 3508th Council meeting, document 15391/16 and press release 67 by the Justice and Home Affairs depart-
ment, section ‘Criminal justice in Cyberspace’, Brussels, 8th and 9th December 2016, page 7. 
386 European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, ‘ENISA’s Opinion Paper on Encryption - Strong Encryption 
Safeguards our Digital Identity’, December 2016, page 5. 
387 The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies is an independent advisory body of the President of the 
European Commission. 
388 Opinion No. 28 of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, ‘Ethics of Security and Surveillance 
Technologies’, Brussels May 20th 2014, p. 87 ff.. 
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necessity and proportionality of measures.389 This however, is not an issue reserved exclusively to the 
matter of backdoors in encryption, but to all governmental activities involving SOSTs. Especially with the 
increasing use of Big Data analysis tools by LEAs, there is much concern related to citizens having only 
limited possibilities to defend themselves against any mistreatment or security risks based on algorith-
mic-founded suspicion. The same counts not only for LEA activity in the context of specific crime pre-
vention or investigation, but also for intelligence in the interest of national security.  
Naturally, all intelligence institutions aim at being able to use IT vulnerabilities to target individuals and 
organisations endangering national security. However, depending on their competences and objectives, 
these institutions may sometimes have several, contradicting goals. For example, it appears doubtful 
whether both SIGINT390 and COMSEC391 missions can be pursued by the very same institutions without 
triggering unexpected internal dichotomies regarding cybersecurity issues. 
Discrepancies between offensive and defensive strategies are also particularly striking with regard to 
any legislative acts requiring technology to generally undermine the privacy and security of citizen’s 
computers and communications. This is evident when observing the on-going political and public debate 
around governments collecting personal information of their citizens. Examples are the EU-level and 
national controversies around data retention, counter-terrorism legislation, and the expansion of intel-
ligence services’ competences and cooperation. Combating crime and terrorism definitely plays a role 
in the political and legislative landscape of the European member countries. However, these on- going 
debates have enough impact, which can also lead to further developments of the concepts of data pro-
tection and privacy in jurisprudence. An example is Germany, where such concepts were further devel-
oped by differing between the concept of privacy and the concept of information control.392 Already in 
1983, the German Federal Constitutional Court issued its census landmark decision, which said that the 
principle of the informational self-determination (translated: ‘Informationelle Selbstbestimmung) is a 
constitutional right in itself.393 Building on this legal history, another decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court was issued February 2008, which established a right of every citizen to have full 
integrity and confidentiality of his or her information technology systems (translated: ‘Recht auf 
Gewährleistung der Vertraulichkeit und Integrität informationstechnischer Systeme’). Due to conflict 
with this right, a federal law on the domestic intelligence service for the federal state North Rhine West-
phalia allowing broad secret online searches of citizen’s personal computers was declared unconstitu-
tional. The court clarified that any secret online searches must occur under very strict preconditions 
only. This typically requires a judicial warrant and a strong indication of an imminent threat to the life, 
the physical integrity or the liberty of persons, or to the foundations of the state or the existence of 
mankind.394 On European level, such further developments are not so evident, yet the stance of the EU 
with regard to citizen’s fundamental rights is always subject to public scrutiny.  
Cybersecurity is a matter of concern not only in the context of police and national security, or solely for 
EU-located state actors. Instead, it is a global issue, motivating also private actors to think about optimal 
cybersecurity strategies in order to mitigate risks.395 The World Economic Forum (WEF), a Swiss non-
profit foundation committed to bring business, political, academic, and other leaders together for dia-
logue on global, regional, and industry agendas, has also taken stance on cybersecurity. In its Global Risk 
                                                          
389 Cf. Austin, L. M., ‘Surveillance and the Rule of Law’, debate article published in the Surveillance & Society Journal, Vol 13, 
No 2 (2015), p. 298. 
390 Signals Intelligence, for example getting access to the content of people’s emails. 
391 Communications Security, with the ultimate goal of protecting communications, e.g. of government officials. 
392 For the conjunction between the definitions of privacy and identity, see Rannenberg, K.; Royer, D.; Deuker, A. (ed.): ‘The 
Future of Identity in Information Society - Challenges and Opportunities’, pp. 292 ff. (section 7.3: ‘When Idem meets Ipse: The 
Identity of the European Citizen’). 
393 Census decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court (in German: Volkszählungsurteil Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 
15th December 1983 (Az.: 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83). 
394 Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 27th February 2008, (Az.: 1 BvR 370/07). 
395 An example is The Atlantic Council of the United States, ‘A Nonstate Strategy for Saving Cyberspace’, Atlantic Council Strat-
egy Paper No. 8, January 2017. 
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Report 2017, the WEF identified twelve key emerging technologies playing a role for the cybersecurity 
landscape of the future. There key technologies are: 3D printing, advanced materials and nanomaterials, 
artificial intelligence and robotics, biotechnologies, energy capture, storage and transmission, block-
chain and distributed ledger, geoengineering, ubiquitous linked sensors, neurotechnologies, new com-
puting technologies, such as quantum computing, or neural network processing, space technologies, 
and virtual and augmented realities.396 
 
 
Figure A4.1: Simplified overview of cybersecurity issues 
 
Many of such upcoming and future technologies will need adequate cybersecurity protections. There-
fore, it is already foreseeable that with the growing digitalisation of the modern world, the need to 
address cybersecurity in an organised way will only increase.  
 
A4.3 Cross-cutting Issues Mitigation 
It becomes increasingly acknowledged that the cybersecurity issues landscape can change very fast, 
leaving policy-makers, data protection and cybersecurity experts at a strategical and operational disad-
vantage. Within the cybersecurity domain, the effectiveness of offensive measures taken mostly by gov-
ernmental actors is often questioned. This is due to doubtful allocation of cybersecurity attacks and 
related insecurities regarding accurate forensic evidence to target the true attackers for retaliation pur-
poses.397 Therefore, some cybersecurity experts advise to focus more on defensive strategies in order 
to protect valuable assets. This is where the above-mentioned implementation of technical and organ-
isational measures required by the current as well as the upcoming European data protection frame-
work may also support cybersecurity in general. The responsibilities of the controller and processor 
entities as well as principles like data protection by design and default are focused strongly on either 
eliminating or at least mitigating any risks for the personal information of individuals, regardless of the 
type of attack. This is a considerable approach because at the moment, the cybersecurity domain pro-
vides much collaboration and information on the national level of the EU member countries, yet so far, 
lacks a clear, organised mandate to enforce the implementation of protective measures on European 
level. Nonetheless, it must be expected that with the future European data protection framework, the 
competent supervisory authorities will cooperate more while using their increased enforcement powers 
granted by the new law. So it makes sense to combine and align both the IT security and the data pro-
tection perspective because together, they can provide values as well as means to ascertain threats and 
                                                          
396 Global Risks Report 2017, 12th Edition, published by the World Economic Forum within the framework of The Global Com-
petitiveness and Risks Team, Part 3: Emerging Technologies, subchapter 3.1: Understanding the Technology Risks Landscape, 
p. 42. 
397 This was explicitly acknowledged by many cybersecurity experts, also abroad, see as an example the cybersecurity policy/ap-
proach of the US Obama administration, cf. Marks, Joseph: ‘Obama’s Cyber Legacy: He Did (Almost) Everything Right and It Still 
Turned Out Wrong’, January 17th 2017. 
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to determine mitigation measures. While addressing both security and data protection, it appears rea-
sonable not to invent the wheel anew, but to refer to known standards and instruments like ISO/IEC 
27001 and/or code of conducts as well as to process-oriented approaches (plan, do check, act). For the 
realisation, an effective assignment of clear responsibilities, time periods, as well as a prioritization of 
measures implementation should be the primary goal. To plan, implement and evaluate processes, pro-
cedures and measures in an optimal way, a data protection management system should always make 
clear cross-references to an eventually already existing IT security management system (ISMS) to avoid 
divergences, conflicts, contradictions, and unnecessary overlaps. 
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Annex 5: Cybersecurity Definitions  
Developed by EU Member States 
The table below provides an overview of cybersecurity definitions developed in national cybersecurity 
strategies of 18 EU Member States. While there are some similarities between the listed definitions, the 
variety of definitions is overwhelming as is the vocabulary invoked within them. In cases, where a strat-
egy did not provide a definition for ‘cybersecurity’, we looked for definitions of the term ‘cyberspace’. 
Some definitions suggest a more limited understating of cybersecurity, focusing on technical require-
ments and protection of virtual assets (e.g., the Dutch Cybersecurity Strategy), whereas others are more 
compressive in their scope (e.g., Slovakian, Hungarian and Czech). Luxembourg and Latvia adopted the 
term proposed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). National strategies that are listed 
below are available in English and can be downloaded on the website of the European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security (ENISA). 
 
# Document title, country, year Definition 
1.  Austrian Cyber Security Strategy, 
2013  
The term “cyber security” stands for the security of infrastruc-
tures in cyber space, of the data exchanged in cyber space and 
above all of the people using cyber space. 
2.  Croatian Cybersecurity strategy, 
2015 
Cyber security - encompasses activities and measures for 
achieving the confidentiality, integrity and availability of infor-
mation and systems in cyberspace. 
3.  Czech Republic Cybersecurity Strat-
egy for the period of 2015-2020 
 
Cyber security comprises a sum of organizational, political, le-
gal, technical, and educational measures and tools aiming to 
provide a secure, protected, and resilient cyberspace in the 
Czech Republic for the benefit of both public and private sec-
tors, as well as for the general public. 
4.  Cybersecurity Strategy of the Re-
public of Cyprus: Network and Infor-
mation Security and Protection of 
Critical Information Infrastructures, 
2012 
Cybersecurity refers to the broader security of networked sys-
tems that operate in cyberspace, i.e. in most cases connected 
to the Internet, and this term also covers the safe and secure 
usage of these systems by end users. 
5.  Dutch National Cyber Security: 
Strategy From awareness to capabil-
ity, 2014 
Cyber security refers to efforts to prevent damage caused by 
disruptions to, breakdowns in or misuse of ICT and to repair 
damage if and when it has occurred. Such damage may consist 
of any or all of the following: reduced reliability of ICT, limited 
availability and violation of the confidentiality and/or integrity 
of information stored in the ICT systems. 
6.  Estonian Cyber Security Strategy, 
2014-2017 
Cyber security is an integral part of national security, it supports 
the functioning of the state and society, the competitiveness of 
the economy and innovation. 
7.  Finland’s Cyber security Strategy, 
2013 
Cyber security means the desired end state in which the cyber 
domain is reliable and in which its functioning is ensured. 
8.  Italian National Strategic Framework 
for Cyberspace Security, 2013 
With the term cyberspace we refer to the complex of all inter-
connected ICT hardware and software infrastructure, to all data 
stored in and transferred through the networks and all con-
nected users, as well as to all logical connections however es-
tablished among them. It therefore encompasses the Internet 
and all communication cables, networks and connections that 
support information and data processing, including all mobile 
Internet devices. 
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9.  Cyber Security Strategy for Ger-
many, 2011  
Cyberspace is the virtual space of all IT systems linked at data 
level on a global scale. The basis for cyberspace is the Internet 
as a universal and publicly accessible connection and transport 
network which can be complemented and further expanded by 
any number of additional data networks. IT systems in an iso-
lated virtual space are not part of cyberspace. 
10.  Hungarian Government Decision 
No. 1139/2013 (21 March) on the 
National Cyber Security Strategy of 
Hungary, 2013 
Cyber security is the continuous and planned taking of political, 
legal, economic, educational, awareness-raising and technical 
measures to manage risks in cyberspace that transforms the cy-
berspace into a reliable environment for the smooth function-
ing and operation of societal and economic processes by ensur-
ing an acceptable level of risks in cyberspace. 
11.  Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia, 
2014-2018  
Cyber security is the collection of tools, policies, security con-
cepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management ap-
proaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and tech-
nologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and 
organization and user’s assets. Organisation and user’s assets 
include connected computing devices, personnel, infrastruc-
ture, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and 
the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the 
cyber environment. 
12.  Lithuanian Cyber Security Strategy, 
2011-2019 
Electronic information security equates to cyber security. 
13.  Luxembourg Cybersecurity Strategy, 
2015 
Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security con-
cepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management ap-
proaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and tech-
nologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and 
organisation and user assets. Organisation and user assets in-
clude connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, 
applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the to-
tality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber en-
vironment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and 
maintenance of the security properties of the organization and 
user assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environ-
ment. The general security objectives comprise the following: 
- Availability; 
- Integrity, which may include authenticity and non-re-
pudiation; 
- Confidentiality. 
14.  Malta, National Cyber Security Strat-
egy, Green Paper, 2015 
Cybersecurity ‘is the safeguards and actions that can be used to 
protect cyber domain from those threats that are associated 
with or that may harm its interdependent networks and infor-
mation infrastructure. It strives to preserve the availability and 
integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidenti-
ality of the information contained therein.’ 
15.  Cyberspace Protection Policy of the 
Republic of Poland, 2013 
Cyberspace security – a set of organizational and legal, tech-
nical, physical and educational projects aimed at ensuring the 
uninterrupted functioning of cyberspace. 
16.  Cyber Security Concept of the Slo-
vak Republic for 2015 - 2020 
Cyber security is one of the defining elements of the security 
environment of the Slovak Republic and a subsystem of national 
security. At a state level, it is a system of continuous and 
planned increasing of political, legal, economic, security, de-
fence and educational awareness, also including the efficiency 
of adopted and applied risk control measures of a technical-or-
ganizational nature in cyber space in order to transform it into a 
trustworthy environment providing for the secure operation of 
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social and economic processes at an acceptable level of risks in 
cyber space. 
17.  National Cyber Security Strategy of 
Spain, 2013 
Cyber security is a necessity of our society and our economic 
model. 
18.  UK National Cyber Security Strategy, 
2016-2021  
‘Cyber security’ refers to the protection of information systems 
(hardware, software and associated infrastructure), the data on 
them, and the services they provide, from unauthorised access, 
harm or misuse. This includes harm caused intentionally by the 
operator of the system, or accidentally, as a result of failing to 
follow security procedures. 
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Annex 5: EU values 
This annex outlines European Union (EU) values listed in the EU governing treaties and it also provides 
a brief explanation of each value. The table below lists values included in the Treaty of the EU and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EU Charter). The third column merges notions provided in 
the two legally binding documents into one list. 
 
Treaty of the EU, Article 2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU, Preamble 
EU values 
Human dignity 
Freedom 
Democracy 
Equality (including equality  
between women and men) 
Non-discrimination 
The rule of law 
Respect for human rights  
(including the rights of persons be-
longing to minorities) 
Pluralism 
Tolerance 
Justice 
Solidarity 
Human dignity 
Freedom 
Democracy 
Equality 
The rule of law 
Solidarity 
Protection of individuals by estab-
lishing the citizenship of the Union 
and by creating an area of free-
dom, security and justice 
 
Human dignity 
Freedom 
Democracy 
Equality 
Non-discrimination 
The rule of law 
Respect for human rights 
Pluralism 
Tolerance 
Justice 
Solidarity 
Protection of EU citizens 
 
The descriptions below present an attempt to highlight the main aspects of EU values that are listed in 
EU governing treaties. It can be argued that EU values listed in the table above morphed out of the EU 
Member States’ constitutional traditions and the fundamental rights framework, which is guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. EU values 
and principles have been subject to legal scholarship and extensive case law and therefore it should be 
noted that descriptions provided below shed little light on the complexity of each notion. For further 
reading, please consult the Charterpedia webpage that was created by the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA).398 
Human dignity – [t]he dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but consti-
tutes the real basis of fundamental rights. […] It results that none of the rights laid down in this Charter 
may be used to harm the dignity of another person, and that the dignity of the human person is part of 
the substance of the rights laid down in this Charter. It must therefore be respected, even where a right 
is restricted.399 
Freedoms are addressed in Chapter II of the EU Charter. This chapter encompasses Articles 6 to 19 and 
includes: the right to liberty and security (Article 6), respect for private and family life (Article 7), pro-
tection of personal data (Article 8), right to marry and right to found a family (Article 9), freedom of 
                                                          
398 Chartapedia, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia.  
399 This definition is provided by the Fundamental Rights Agency, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/1-
human-dignity#group-info-explanations.  
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thought, conscience and religion (Article 10), freedom of expression and information (Article11), free-
dom of assembly and of association (Article 12), freedom of the arts and sciences (Article 13), right to 
education (Article 14), freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15), free-
dom to conduct a business (Article 16), right to property (Article 17), right to asylum (Article 18), pro-
tection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition (Article 19).  
Democracy is one of the key requirements that has to be met in order for a country to join the EU. The 
European Council Conclusions presented in Copenhagen in 1993 (often referred as the Copenhagen 
criteria) considers democracy to be a political condition that signifies that a country ‘has achieved sta-
bility of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protec-
tion of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.’400 
Equality is one of the general principles of EU law that was recognized in early case law of the Court of 
Justice of the EU.401 This principle is enshrined in Chapter III of EU Charter. Article 20 of EU Charter 
proclaims that ‘[e]veryone is equal before the law.’ This chapter includes different dimensions of equal-
ity which including gender equality (Article 23). This chapter also prohibits ‘[a]ny discrimination based 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or 
belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age 
or sexual orientation’ (Article 21). The underlying objectives of equality and non-discrimination princi-
ples have been further pursued in the EU secondary law such as the Equal Treatment Directive in the 
context of employment (Directive 2006/54/EC) and the Directive implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (Directive 2000/43). 
Solidarity is the term that is subject to the diverse use in different contexts. This principle aims at bal-
ancing economic (market focused) and social protection objectives in EU law and it is enshrined in Chap-
ter IV of EU Charter.402 Articles 27 to 34 of the EU Charter concern employment social cares contexts, 
such as: workers’ right to information and consultation (Article 27), right to collective bargaining and 
action (Article 28), right of access to placement services (Article 29), protection in the event of unjusti-
fied dismissal (Article 30), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), prohibition of child labour and 
protection of young people at work (Article 32), family and professional life (Article 33), and social se-
curity and social assistance (Article 34), access to health care (Article 35), access to services of general 
economic interest (Article 36), environmental protection (Article 37) and consumer protection (Article 
38).  
The rule of law is one of key requirements for EU membership. While it is not specified, it implies that 
countries, which want to join the EU, firstly have to make sure that a judiciary branch in their country is 
independent, impartial and functions well. As explained on the European Commission portal: ‘this in-
cludes, for example, guaranteed access to justice, fair trial procedures, adequate funding for courts and 
training for magistrates and legal practitioners.’403 It also means that ‘their government and its officials 
and agents are accountable under the law and that political leaders and decision-makers take a clear 
stance against corruption’.404 Lastly, this principle entails a legislation process that is fair, efficient and 
transparent; laws must be concise and made available for the general public.  
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Respect for human rights scores high on the EU agenda and it is reflected in EU primary (i.e., EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights) and secondary (e.g., the General Data Protection Regulation) legislation as well 
as in external action activities. The EU aims at mainstreaming the human rights and democratisation 
objectives by integrating them into negotiations on trade and cooperation agreements as well as by 
hosting dialogues on human rights. The latter allows determining ‘possible ways of increasing […] [a 
concerned] country’s commitment towards international human rights instruments’.405 The EU Strategic 
Framework on Human Rights and Democracy ‘reaffirms [EU] commitment to the promotion and pro-
tection of all human rights, whether civil and political, or economic, social and cultural’.  406 The same 
Strategic Framework ‘calls on all States to implement the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and to ratify and implement the key international human rights treaties, including core la-
bour rights conventions, as well as regional human rights instruments.’407 The EU also promotes human 
rights through its participation in multilateral forums such as the UN General Assembly’s Third Commit-
tee, the UN Human Rights Council, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and 
the Council of Europe.408 
Tolerance is considered to be ‘the opposite of any form of unlawful discrimination’.409 The most elabo-
rate definition of tolerance is provided in 1995 UN Declaration of Principles on Tolerance. According to 
this definition, tolerance means ‘respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our 
world’s cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, open-
ness, communication and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in differ-
ence. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that 
makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace’.410 
The UN Declaration notes that ‘[t]olerance is to be exercised by individuals, groups and States’. Toler-
ance is essential for the pluralism (including constitutional, religious, linguistic and cultural pluralism) to 
flourish.  
The notion of justice is captured in Chapter VI of the EU Charter (Articles 47-50). This principle aims at 
ensuring procedural rights of individuals, in particular, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial 
(Article 47), presumption of innocence and right of defence (Article 48), principles of legality and pro-
portionality of criminal offences and penalties (Article 49), and the right not to be tried or punished 
twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence (Article 50). Justice in the form of impartial 
administration is a precondition to safeguard human rights.  
Protection of EU citizens encompasses the rights of EU citizens laid down in Chapter V of the EU Charter 
and cooperation activities concerning the area of freedom, security and justice. Citizens’ rights include:  
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament (Article 39), right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections (Article 40), right to good administration 
(Article 41), right of access to documents (Article 42), the right to refer to the European Ombudsman 
cases of maladministration in the activities of EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies (Article 43), the 
right to petition to the European Parliament (Article 44), freedom of movement and of residence (Article 
45), and the right to diplomatic and consular protection by any Member State, on the same conditions 
as the nationals of that Member State (Article 46). 
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